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ABSTRACT
Compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  f o r  " e s s e n t ia l "  p u b l i c  sa fe ty  employees in 
Michigan has been the law since the passage of  P ub l ic  Act 312 in 1969. 
The purpose of  t h i s  research is  to  examine the cond i t ions  found in 
p u b l i c  sa fe ty  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining p r io r  to the enactment o f  the law, 
as w e l l  as the law's e f fe c ts  on cur ren t  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining e f f o r t s .
Special a t te n t io n  is  g iven to proposed changes in the cu r ren t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  through both l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m in is t ra t i v e  perspect ives.  
Major a l t e r n a t i v e s  to the Act are a lso  discussed in d e t a i l ,  as are the 
Act 's economic considerat ions. Both general and s p e c i f i c  conclusions 
are then advanced based upon the f in d ing s  of  the research.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  in labor  d isputes i n v o l v i n g  essen t ia l  
se rv ices  has been the law in Michigan since 1969 w i th  the passage of  
Pub l ic  Act 312. Arguments about labor  d isputes in the p u b l ic  sector  
had become more heated in the preceding decade. While a large 
m a jo r i t y  o f  a l l  those in v o lv e d  opposed s t r i k e s  in the area o f  
" e s s e n t ia l "  p u b l i c  serv ices ,  the means to  s e t t l e  these disputes were 
f a r  from reaching any consensus.
Some persons in v o lv e d  are not on ly  opposed to s t r i k e s  by p o l ic e  
and f i r e  personnel, but are a lso  opposed to compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  to 
s e t t l e  the disputes. These i n d iv i d u a l s  are the ones in v o lv e d  in 
t r y in g  to  repeal or s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l t e r  P ub l ic  Act 312 in i t s  cur ren t  
form.
The la rge  m a jo r i t y  however seem to  be against s t r i k e s  in the 
p u b l i c  sector,  e s p e c ia l l y  in the area o f  " e s s e n t ia l "  serv ices,  but 
fa v o r in g  some form of  mandatory d ispute re s o lu t io n  which is  f a i r  to 
both the m u n ic ip a l i t y  and worker a l i k e .  The major question appears to 
be in what form w i l l  the d ispute r e s o lu t io n  e x is t ,  not whether i t  w i l l  
exi s t .
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Debate has i n t e n s i f i e d  in the past few years w i th  c r i t i c s  o f  
Pub l ic  Act 312 c a l l i n g  fo r  e i t h e r  i t s  repea l ,  or d r a s t i c  amendments to 
i t s  use and implementation. Most o f  these c a l l s  f o r  change appear to  
o r ig in a te  w i th  the a dm in is t ra to rs  o f  the m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  where the 
employee unions have invoked the process to s e t t l e  a labor  d ispute.  
They have been jo ined  by a l im i t e d  number o f  researchers who a lso  
b e l ie v e  the cu r ren t  process has some ser ious drawbacks.
One of  the major concerns of  these proponents o f  change is  th a t  
the law a l low s  f o r  a t h i r d  pa r ty  outs ide of  the groups in v o lv e d  to 
make dec is ions o n ly  the group w i l l  have to  l i v e  with . A r b i t r a to r s  
merely render a decis ion, they do not t e l l  the governmental u n i t  how 
to  pay f o r  the award given.
The problem which must be faced would appear to be one o f  how and 
when the compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  process is  invoked, as w e l l  as the 
c r i t e r i a  on which the a r b i t r a t o r s  must base t h e i r  decis ion. S t i l l  
others do not argue wi th  the c r i t e r i a  a lready in place. They would
l i k e  the a r b i t r a t o r  to  consider c e r ta in  po in ts  more important  than
others when he renders his  dec is ion .
The importance o f  t h i s  top ic  is  as great  today as i t  was almost
twenty years ago. I n i t i a l l y ,  there remains almost no p u b l ic  support 
f o r  work stoppages or slowdowns by p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel. I f  t h i s  
premise is  accepted, some mechanism must be in p lace to  re so lve  the 
dispute. Arguments as to form and context can be made and 
subsequent ly supported, but the need fo r  some type o f  law is  c l e a r l y  
seen.
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Secondly, the law a f fe c ts  l i t e r a l l y  every  u n i t  o f  government as 
w e l l  as every c i t i z e n  in the State of Michigan, some arguably  more so 
than others. L i f e  and proper ty  as w e l l  as general l i v i n g  cond i t ions  
are g e n e r a l l y  adverse ly  a f fec ted  by s t r i k e s  or slowdowns by esse n t ia l  
pub l ic  secto r  employees.
Most would a lso  agree tha t ,  when two p a r t ie s  come to  an impasse 
in nego t ia t ions  and the workers are p roh ib i ted  from w i th h o ld in g  
serv ices  because o f  s ta te  law, there should be some place fo r  them to 
tu rn  f o r  r e l i e f .  P o l ice  personnel, and to  a lesse r  ex tent  f i r e  
personnel, are c a l l e d  upon to render f a i r  and im p a r t ia l  decis ions as a 
rou t ine  pa r t  o f  t h e i r  job performance. In order to maintain these 
a t t i t u d e s ,  they a lso  need to  fee l  tha t  they w i l l  rece ive  a f a i r  and 
im p a r t ia l  hearing on t h e i r  demands, and in tu rn  rece ive  a f a i r  
dec is ion based upon p ro p e r ly  considered evidence. Tens o f  thousands 
o f  p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel, w i thou t  the r i g h t  to  s t r i k e ,  have 
nowhere else to  tu rn .
Through a thorough search of  the l i t e r a t u r e ,  the h is to r y  of 
unionism in the p u b l i c  sector  w i l l  be examined as w i l l  the l e g i s l a t i v e  
h i s to r y  of  P ub l ic  Act 312. The major issues surrounding Pub l ic  Act 
312 w i l l  be discussed and conclusions w i l l  be drawn as to t h e i r  
v a l i d i t y  and importance by using the f in d in gs  of prev ious studies.
An in v e s t ig a t io n  v/i 1 1 a lso  be conducted to  ascer ta in  how other 
s ta tes  and coun t r ies  have d e a l t  w i th  the issue of compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n  in the area of  essen t ia l  p u b l ic  employees. Conclusions
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w i l l  be drawn as to  t h e i r  e f f i c i e n c y  and fa i rn e ss  and whether any 
par ts  o f  the laws could be su ccess fu l ly  appl ied in Michigan.
The major issue concerning Pub l ic  Act 312 in v o lv e s  wage increases 
which p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel have received since the law went in to  
e f fe c t .  C r i t i c s  have contended th a t  the law has g iven p o l i c e  and f i r e  
personnel an u n fa i r  advantage in t h e i r  nego t ia t ions  w i th  
m u n ic ip a l i t i e s .  Some have contended th a t  a r b i t r a t i o n  awards have been 
higher than what was supported by the evidence. S t i l l  others have 
contended th a t  m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  have s e t t l e d  v o l u n t a r i l y  f o r  more than 
they should have s imp ly  because they were a f r a id  of a r b i t r a t i o n .
To te s t  c la ims about a r b i t r a t i o n  awards increases in s a la r ie s  
achieved through a r b i t r a t i o n  w i l l  be contrasted w i th  severa l  o ther 
ind ices. For s t a t i s t i c a l  purposes, the year 1967 w i l l  be used as a 
base year f o r  a l l  s t a t i s t i c s .
The f i r s t  s t a t i s t i c  w i l l  be the Consumer Pr ice Index (CPI). This 
w i l l  make i t  poss ib le  to t rack  the growth of  i n f l a t i o n  through the 
periods to be examined, and w i l l  a lso  serve as a w e l l  accepted 
benchmark by which comparisons can be made.
By using in fo rm a t ion  from p u b l ic a t io n s  of the Michigan Munic ipal 
League, both p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel wage increases w i l l  be 
examined. To maintain un i fo rm i ty ,  wages fo r  the groups w i l l  be taken 
from m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  w i th  popu la t ions of 25,000-50,000 fo r  each of the 
periods. From t h i s  in fo rmat ion ,  an average wage can be obtained fo r  
each year and the increases fo l low e d  from before the Act's incept ion 
to today.
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The Michigan Education Assoc ia t ion  w i l l  p rov ide  the necessary 
in fo rm a t ion  on the wage increases o f  teachers in Michigan through each 
of  the periods. This in fo rm a t ion  w i l l  be extremely important f o r  
comparison purposes because w h i le  school teachers are p u b l ic  employees 
and, by law, are not a l lowed to  s t r i k e ,  they do in f a c t  s t r i k e .  The 
obvious quest ion would then be, have teachers received higher wage 
increases by o c c a s io n a l ly  re s o r t in g  to  a s t r i k e ?  Have teachers needed 
to  w i thho ld  se rv ices  on occasion to maintain t h e i r  wages in r e la t i o n  
to  the CPI and p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel who have compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n ?
One f i n a l  comparison w i l l  be made using the average manufacturing 
wage measured against  the CPI as w e l l  as p o l ic e  and f i r e  wage 
increases. This aspect o f  the ana lys is  w i l l  focus on how the legal  
r i g h t  to  s t r i k e  has a f fec ted  wage increases in the p r i v a te  sector.
A f te r  these analyses are completed, conclusions can be drawn as 
to  whether po1ice and f i r e  personnel have received abnormal ly  la rge 
wage increases or merely kept pace with  i n f l a t i o n  and other employee 
groups. With these analyses completed, suggestions w i l l  be made as to 
p o ss ib le  changes in the law which could improve i t s  e f f i c i e n c y  or 
f a i  rness.
CHAPTER I I  
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As re c e n t l y  as the 1950's, on ly  a small  percentage of  a l l  p u b l i c  
sector  employees were organized in to  any type of  union. In add i t ion ,  
no s ta te  a l lowed f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  bargain ing in the p u b l i c  sector. 
S t r ikes  were i l l e g a l  and of fenders were d e a l t  w i th  in harsh manner. 
Most i n d i v i d u a l s  in v o lv e d  in union organiz ing were of  the op in ion th a t  
the p u b l i c  secto r s imply  could not be organized (Freeman, 1986, p.
41). The s p e c i f i c  exc lus ion  o f  p u b l i c  secto r employees from the 
National Labor Re la t ions  Act of  1935 a lso  served as a major impediment 
to  union o rgan iza t ion  f o r  these employees.
P ub l ic  employees in Michigan were f i r s t  g iven c o l l e c t i v e  
barga in ing r i g h ts  w i th  the passage of  the Hutchinson Act in 1947. 
L e g is la t io n  however a l lowed fo r  l i t t l e  more than employees to "meet 
and confer"  w i th  t h e i r  employers to  determine wages and other working 
cond i t ions .  Employees were s p e c i f i c a l l y  denied the r i g h t  to  s t r i k e  
which l e f t  the f i n a l  terms and cond i t ions of employment res t ing  s o l e l y  
w i th  management (Kruger, 1985, p. 497). Pub l ic  employees were 
protected by C i v i l  Serv ice but t h i s  provided no r e l i e f  in terms of  
c o n t rac t  nego t ia t ions .
6
7
Sy the beginning of the 1960's, membership in "assoc ia t ions "  was 
q u i te  common in the p u b l i c  sector. The assoc ia t ions were opposed to  
c o l l e c t i v e  bargain ing in w r i t i n g ,  but continued to demand wage p a r i t y  
w i th  the p r i v a te  sector. While unions in the p u b l i c  sec to r  were not 
i l l e g a l ,  they had to func t ion  v/ i thout  lega l  p ro tec t ion  and e x c lu s iv e  
recogni t i  on.
Various s ta tes soon began to grant l im i t e d  s ta tus  to  these 
employee associa t ions as they grew in both s ize and p o l i t i c a l  
s trength. The most s i g n i f i c a n t  governmental act ion o r ig in a te d  on the 
na t iona l  l e v e l  in the nature of Execut ive Order 1098S, signed by 
President John F. Kennedy in 1962. The order provided f o r  the actual 
recogn i t ion  of unions to represent federa l  employees, w h i le  at the 
same time l i m i t i n g  the actual amount of bargain ing power they held 
during nego t ia t ions  (R. Theodore Clark, 1972, pp. 111-112).
By the mid-1960's, w i th  Executive Order 10988 behind them, unions 
in the p u b l ic  sector had quadrupled in s ize (Freeman, 1986, p. 41). 
This tremendous upswing in p u b l ic  sector union membership occurred at 
the same t ime union format ion in the p r iv a te  sector  was slowing i t s  
pace, and even d e c l in ing  in some areas.
The Hutchinson Act was a lso  amended in 1965, becoming the Pub l ic  
Employment Relat ions Act (PERA). While re ta in in g  the o r ig in a l  s t r i k e  
p ro h ib i t i o n ,  i t  a lso  lessened the pena l t ies .  I t  a lso  gave the 
employees s p e c i f i c  r ig h ts  to both organize as w e l l  as bargain 
c o l l e c t i v e l y .  Mediat ion and fac t  f in d in g  were continued in to  PERA 
from the Hutchinson Act.
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I t  is  important to  r e a l i z e  at t h i s  po in t  in labor  law h is to r y  
th a t  the cu r ren t  laws provided fo r  l i t t l e  more than a l lo w in g  employees 
to  vo1' : f o r  or against c o l l e c t i v e  representa t ion ,  and re q u i r in g  
management to negot ia te  w i th  them. At no time were employees a l lowed 
to s t r i k e  or engage in work slowdowns v/ i thout  fac ing sanctions. 
Employees were faced w i th  a "take i t  or leave i t "  approach from t h e i r  
h ie ra rchy  on l i t e r a l l y  every  issue.
Some types of  work stoppages in the pu b l ic  secto r  were more 
" t o l e r a b l e "  than others, w h i le  s t i l l  other groups were d e a l t  wi th  
s w i f t l y  and harshly. S t r ikes  and slowdowns of  employee labor  were 
to le r a te d  fo r  at lea s t  shor t  periods o f  t ime with  the exception of 
essen t ia l  serv ices"  (Freeman, 1986, pp. 42-44).
"Essent ia l  se rv ices"  soon came to be defined as p o l ic e  and f i r e  
serv ices.  Pub l ic  sa fe ty  personnel now found themselves in a lo n e ly  
and awkward pos i t ion .  F rus t ra t ions  at the bargain ing ta b le  and a 
perceived i n a b i l i t y  to  achieve an e q u i tab le  con t rac t  soon led to 
i l l e g a l  work slowdowns and "b lue f l u " .
Pub l ic  employers countered wi th  the notion tha t  the p u b l ic  
employee had no r i g h t  to  w i thho ld  serv ices  which were not a v a i l a b l e  
from the p r i v a te  sector. A major p ropos i t ion  a lso  advanced was the 
fa c t  tha t  demand fo r  p u b l ic  sector labor  is  h ig h ly  i n e la s t i c .  No 
matter  how high the p r ice  o f  wages and bene f i ts  were to c l imb, there  
would always remain a demand fo r  those serv ices  (Chimezie A.3.
Osigweh, 1985, pp. 75-77).
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I t  was a lso  reasoned th a t  essen t ia l  serv ices  could e f f e c t i v e l y  be 
held hostage by greedy, uny ie ld ing  c i v i l  servants  w a i t in g  f o r  a ransom 
to  re tu rn  to work. A f te r  much discussion, i t  was determined th a t  the 
o n ly  t r u l y  essen t ia l  serv ices  were those o f  p o l ice ,  f i r e ,  co r rec t ions ,  
and poss ib ly  s a n i ta t io n  workers (Osigweh, 1985, p. 77),
Various arguments from both sides of  the issue soon surfaced. 
Poss ib ly  the la rg e s t  roadblock forwarded at the t ime and s t i l l  argued 
now is  the "sove re ign ty  theory". They held tha t  i t  was the 
government's so le  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  make budgetary decis ions, as w e l l  
as set ra tes o f  pay. These decis ions could not be abdicated to the 
employee.
Unions countered wi th  the idea tha t  government s u p p l ie rs  o f  
goods, as w e l l  as serv ices,  were a l lowed to negot ia te  cons t ruc t ion  and 
d e l i v e r y  schedules as w e l l  as pr ice  terms. I f  i t  were indeed 
pe rm iss ib le  to bargain over goods, the p r ice  of se rv ices  should a lso  
be nego t iab le  (Osigweh, 1985, p. 81).
I t  soon became apparent to a l l  those in v o lv e d  th a t  a f a i r  and 
e q u i ta b le  way was needed to re so lve  these d i f fe rences  in the p u b l i c  
sector. With s t r i k i n g  i l l e g a l ,  procedures were needed to  re so lve  
d isputes when an impasse was reached in negot ia t ions .
Governor George Romney appointed an adv isory  committee in 1966 to 
conduct a thorough review of  how the Pub l ic  Employment Relat ions Act 
had e f fec ted  p u b l ic  employee labor r e la t io n s .  This was done in par t  
as a response to the numerous labor d isputes tha t  had taken place w i th  
po l ice  and f i r e f i g h t e r  labor groups (Kruger, 1985, p. 41).
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The committee's f i n a l  re po r t  to  then Governor George Romney was 
presented to him on February 15, 1967. One of  the committee's 
s t rongest  recommendations was f o r  the estab l ishment o f  mandatory 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  f o r  both p o l ice  and f i r e  labor.
Like much l e g i s l a t i o n ,  P ub l ic  Act 312 took more than one 
l e g i s l a t i v e  session to become law. A f t e r  the p resenta t ion  of  the 
committee's repor t ,  the recommendations were drawn up in to  a formal 
l e g i s l a t i v e  proposal in the form o f  House B i l l  2350 w i th  a t o t a l  o f  12 
co-sponsors. At the time, the l e g i s l a t i o n  d e a l t  o n ly  wi th  f i r e  
departments. IMo mention is  made o f  why p o l ic e  departments were not 
inc luded at t h i s  time. The l e g i s l a t i v e  purpose was r e l a t i v e l y  s imple 
in dea l ing  on ly  w i th  the s e le c t io n  of  members to the a r b i t r a t i o n  
panels, and to  p rov ide f o r  procedures as w e l l  as a u th o r i t y  and 
enforcement of the award. S im i la r  l e g i s l a t i o n  was a lso  proposed in 
the Senate under Senate B i l l  367. Both the House and Senate vers ions 
were al lowed to  d ie  in t h e i r  respect ive  committees.
S im i la r  l e g i s l a t i o n  was proposed again on February 20, 1968 under 
House B i l l  3725. The l e g i s l a t i o n  however now inc luded p o l ic e  
personnel in add i t ion  to  f i r e  personnel, and now had 23 co-sponsors. 
This a d d i t io n a l  support came as a r e s u l t  o f  in c lu d in g  p o l i c e  as 
"esse n t ia l  se rv ices"  and was respons ib le  fo r  almost doubl ing support 
f o r  the B i l l .  On A p r i l  12, 1968, the House passed the b i l l  on a vote 
o f  80-15. Because of  Senate inac t ion ,  the B i l l  s t i l l  did not become 
1 aw.
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Support f o r  the l e g i s l a t i o n  continued to grow and was again 
int roduced in the e a r l y  days o f  February, 1969. T i t l e d  House B i l l  
2324 w i th  31 co-sponsors, hearings were f i n a l l y  held on A p r i l  29,
1969, by the Standing Committee on Labor. Members o f  the Senate a lso  
introduced three separate b i l l s  concerning compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  f o r  
both p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel. Senate B i l l  937 e v e n t u a l l y  took the 
f o r e f r o n t  and was passed a f t e r  considerable debate on June 6, 1969 on 
a 20-17 margin.
State Senator Carl Levin, an outspoken opponent o f  the 
l e g i s l a t i o n  requested permission to at tach a w r i t t e n  exp lana t ion  of  
h is "no" vote to  the l e g i s l a t i v e  record. Levin questioned whether the 
new l e g i s l a t i o n  would in f a c t  improve upon the a l ready e x is t in g  laws 
th a t  provided f o r  o n ly  mediation and fac t  f in d in g  p rov is ions .  Levin 
a lso  questioned whether the new l e g i s l a t i o n  was r e a l l y  necessary in 
l i g h t  o f  a se t t lement ra te  of over 95% of a l l  labor  disputes w i thout  
any work stoppages under cur ren t  laws.
Levin a lso  made note o f  a perceived " d r i f t  in Lansing" which he 
blamed on then Governor M i l  l iken .  Noting tha t  the Governor's o f f i c e  
was a lso  opposed to parts  of the l e g i s l a t i o n ,  Levin noted th a t  l i t t l e  
in f lu e n c e  was exerted over the Republican c o n t r o l l e d  Senate to adopt 
the execu t ive 's  v iewpoint.
On J u ly  IS, 1969, the House voted 77 to 5 in favo r  o f  the B i l l ,  
A f t e r  a short  conference committee, a j o i n t  committee sent the B i l l  to  
Governor M i l  l i k e n  who signed i t  August 14. 1969. A Republican 
c o n t r o l l e d  Senate and a Democratic c o n t r o l l e d  House had f i n a l l y  agreed
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on major labor  law l e g i s l a t i o n  which was subsequent ly signed by a 
moderate Republican governor.
One compromise the opponents o f  the law were ab le  to gain was an 
e x p i ra t io n  date of  June 30, 1972 unless i t  was renewed by the 
l e g is l a t u r e .  The opponents f e l t  th a t  the lav/ would now o n ly  be a 
temporary problem which would f i x  i t s e l f  in due t ime.
Publ ic  Act 312's Major Prov is ions
In order to  a s s is t  in ana lys is  o f  the law's e f fe c t iv e n e s s  at a 
l a t e r  po in t ,  the B i l l ' s  major p rov is ions  and intended e f fe c ts  must be 
examined. The l e g i s l a t i v e  in te n t  concerning compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  
f o r  p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel provided fo r  a p r o h ib i t i o n  of  s t r i k e s  
w h i le  a lso  ma in ta in ing the morale o f  the employees in nego t ia t ing  a 
f a i r  and j u s t  con t rac t .
The b i l l ' s  purpose is  described in i t s  statement of  p u b l ic
p o l ic y .  I t  s ta tes :
I t  is  the p u b l i c  p o l i c y  of t h i s  s ta te  tha t  in 
p u b l ic  p o l i c e  and f i r e  departments, where the 
r i g h t  o f  employees to  s t r i k e  is by law p roh ib i ted ;  
i t  is  r e q u is i t e  to the high morale o f  such 
employees and the e f f i c i e n t  opera tion of such 
departments to a f fo rd  an a l t e rn a te  expedi t ious,  
e f f e c t i v e ,  and b inding procedure f o r  the 
re s o lu t i o n  of d isputes and to tha t  end the 
p rov is ions  of t h i s  act, p rov id ing  fo r  compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n  s h a l l  be l i b e r a l l y  construed.
(M.S.A., p. 561)
C le a r l y  the o v e r r id in g  concern of the l e g i s l a t i o n  was to  a l lo w  fo r  a 
peacefu l ,  e q u i ta b le  and expedi t ious re s o lu t io n  o f  labor  disputes 
a f f e c t in g  policemen and f iremen.
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The Act requ ires  both p a r t ie s  to p a r t i c i p a te  in the compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n  process once e i t h e r  par ty  requests a r b i t r a t i o n .  J u d ic ia l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  is  not required as t h i s  would undermine the l e g i s l a t i v e  
i n te n t  in regards to  the expedi t ious handl ing of  the d isputes.
In the l e g i s l a t i o n ,  o n ly  personnel engaged as pol icemen, f i r e ­
f i g h t e r s ,  emergency medical se rv ice  personnel employed by p o l ic e  or 
f i r e  departments and emergency telephone operators f o r  p o l i c e  and f i r e  
departments were considered "e sse n t ia l " ,  and the re fo re  covered under 
t h i s  Act. The very issue o f  who should be covered is  an important 
question which w i l l  be examined in grea te r  d e t a i l  l a t e r  in t h i s  
analys i  s.
The compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  process cannot be invoked u n t i l  both 
sides have at le a s t  gone to mediat ion and the d ispute is  not ab le to 
be s e t t l e d  to both pa r t ie s  s a t i s fa c t io n  w i th in  30 days or w i th in  a 
longer period of  t ime agreed to by both par t ies .  At t h i s  time, e i t h e r  
pa r ty  may apply fo r  binding a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings by pu t t ing  the 
request in w r i t i n g  to the other party. A copy is  a lso  suppl ied to  the 
Michigan Employment Relat ions Commission.
Once one o f  the pa r t ies  decides to invoke the formal compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings, the process works as fo l lo w s .  Within ten 
days, both sides are to choose t h e i r  respec t ive  delegates which w i l l  
make up two of  the three member t r i p a r t i t e  a r b i t r a t i o n  panel. They 
must then advise the opposing side, as w e l l  as the mediat ion board, of 
t h e i r  choice. Should the two delegates be unable to agree upon an 
" im p a r t i a l ,  competent, and reputab le  person to  act as a r b i t r a t o r "  the
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chairman o f  the s ta te  mediat ion board w i l l  submit a l i s t  o f  three 
p rospec t ive  n e u t ra ls  to each side. Each par ty  may s t r i k e  one name 
from the l i s t .  Should two names remain, the chairman o f  the mediat ion 
board w i l l  s e le c t  the neutra l  from the remaining two names. Should 
on ly  one name remain, th a t  in d iv id u a l  is  the designated neu t ra l .
The im p a r t ia l  a r b i t r a t o r  w i l l  be designated as the chairman and 
c a l l  a hearing to begin w i th in  15 days. The panel w i l l  l i s t  the 
evidence, and arrange fo r  an accurate t r a n s c r i p t  o f  the proceedings. 
The expenses are borne e q u a l l y  by the two pa r t ies  and the s ta te, and, 
unless an extension is  agreed to, hearings w i l l  conclude w i th in  30 
days.
The a r b i t r a t i o n  panel is  empowered to admin is ter  oaths and 
subpoenas to  witnesses and have them enforced in C i r c u i t  Court. The 
panel w i l l  render a decis ion w i th in  30 days o f  the hearing's 
conc lus ion unless an extension is  agreed to by the pa r t ies .
The panel, in rendering i t s  v e r d i c t  is  required to  consider the 
fo l lo w in g  fa c to rs  in i t s  f in d in gs ,  op inions and orders.
(a) The lawful a u th o r i t y  o f  the employer.
(b) S t ip u la t io n s  of  the pa r t ie s .
(c) The in te re s ts  and we l fa re  of the p u b l ic  and 
the f i n a n c ia l  a b i l i t y  of the un i t  o f  government to 
meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of  the wages, hours and cond i t ions  
of employment o f  the employees inv o lv e d  in the 
a r b i t r a t i o n  proceeding wi th  the wages, hours and 
cond i t ions  o f  employment of o ther employees 
performing s im i l a r  serv ices and wi th  other 
employees general ly :
( i )  In p u b l i c  employment in comparable 
communi t i  es.
( i i )  In p r i v a te  employment in comparable 
communi t i  es.
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(e) The average consumer p r ices  f o r  goods and 
serv ices, commonly known as the cost of  l i v i n g .
( f )  The o v e r a l l  compensation p re s e n t ly  received by 
the employees, in c lu d in g  d i r e c t  wage compensation, 
vacations, ho l idays  and o ther excused time, 
insurance and pensions, medical and 
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n  bene f i ts ,  the c o n t in u i t y  and 
s t a b i l i t y  o f  employment, and a l l  other be ne f i t s  
recei ved.
(g) Changes in any o f  the foregoing circumstances 
during the pendency o f  the a r b i t r a t i o n  
proceedi ngs,
(h) Such other fac to rs ,  not confined to the 
foregoing, which are no rm a l ly  or t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
taken in to  cons idera t ion  in the determ inat ion of  
wages, hours and cond i t ions  of  employment through 
v o lu n ta ry  c o l l e c t i v e  bargain ing,  mediat ion, f a c t ­
f in d in g ,  a r b i t r a t i o n  or otherwise between the 
pa r t ies ,  in the p u b l i c  se rv ice  or in p r i v a te  
employment.
The order is  en forceab le  in C i r c u i t  Court and f in e s  o f  up to $250 a 
day can be assessed against  a r e c a l c i t r a n t  employer re fus ing  to  comply 
w i th  a proper f in d in g  o f  the a r b i t r a t i o n  panel. J u d ic ia l  review is  
a l lowed on ly  in cases of  a panel exceeding i t s  a u th o r i t y ,  issuing an 
order unsupported by the evidence, or evidence o f  fraud or co l lu s io n .
The Act requ ires the terms o f  the expired con trac t  to be adhered 
to during the proceedings. I t  a lso  exempts any d isputes under the 
a u th o r i t y  o f  t h i s  Act from any p rov is ions  in the Hutchinson Act which 
may requ i re  f a c t f i n d in g .
Amendments to  Publ ic  Act 312
The Act was amended in 1972 in two important  ways. This was due 
to  concerns in the l e g i s l a t u r e  tha t  the law as i t  was now w r i t t e n  did 
not p lace a high enough l e v e l  o f  importance on v o lu n ta ry  sett lements .
16
The l e g i s l a t u r e  a lso  f e l t  th a t  the a r b i t r a t o r s  needed more power in 
making decis ions Issue by Issue, ra the r  than being l im i t e d  to choosing 
between two complete packages.
The power o f  the Chairman was a l te re d  by way o f  a l lo w in g  him/her 
to  remand the d ispute  back to the p a r t ie s  f o r  up to three more weeks 
o f  nego t ia t ions  i f  he/she f e l t  i t  would be usefu l and b e n e f ic ia l  to  
the v o lu n ta ry  se t t lem en t  of the con trac t .  There was no appeal to  t h i s  
dec is ion and i t  was b inding on both p a r t ie s .
Secondly, and most im po r ta n t ly ,  the a r b i t r a t i o n  format was 
a l te re d ,  from "co n ven t iona l "  to 1a s t - b e s t -o f fe r -b y - i s s u e ,  in the area 
o f  economic issues from "con ven t iona l "  to 1a s t -b e s t -o f fe r -b y - i s s u e .  
Instead o f  having to  s e le c t  one party 's  e n t i r e  package, the a r b i t r a t o r  
was now required to choose issue by issue, basing h is /h e r  decis ion on 
the most reasonable " l a s t  best o f f e r "  of  each side. Noneconomic 
issues remained to be decided through "co n ven t iona l "  a r b i t r a t i o n .
To summarize the basic requirements of  P ub l ic  Act 312: I t  is
intended s t r i c t l y  f o r  use by p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel, as w e l l  as some 
o ther re la te d  emergency personnel. The basic premise of  the Act is  to 
p rov ide f o r  compulsory binding a r b i t r a t i o n  in the area of  economic 
demands, w h i le  main ta in ing convent ional  a r b i t r a t i o n  in noneconomic 
issues. This type of d ispute re s o lu t io n  is  o f fe red  in l i e u  of  
a l lo w in g  t h e i r  respec t ive  groups to engage in lega l  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y ,  
or be subjected to a "take i t  or leave i t "  approach to c o l l e c t i v e  
bargai ni ng.
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The Michigan Employment Relat ions Commission's Role in Publ ic 
Act 312
The Michigan Employment Re la t ions  Commission (MERC) has been 
charged w i th  adm in is te r ing  P ub l ic  Act 312, w h i le  a lso  being s e v e re ly  
l im i t e d  in how i t  may a c t u a l l y  in f lu e n c e  the process, Once the 
Commission receives a request to  invoke P ub l ic  Act 312, i t  must f i r s t  
requ i re  th a t  the mediator s ta te  tha t  negot ia t ions  have been conducted 
in good f a i t h ,  and f u r t h e r  nego t ia t ions  w i l l  not r e s u l t  in a 
negot ia ted se t t lement.  The Commission w i l l  then s e le c t  three poss ib le  
a r b i t r a t o r s  from t h e i r  l i s t  and send the names to  the opposing 
pa r t ie s .
Each par ty  w i l l  then have the op por tun i ty  to  s t r i k e  one name from 
the l i s t ,  lea v ing  one name remaining. This i n d iv id u a l  w i l l  then 
assume the p o s i t io n  o f  chairman o f  the t r i p a r t i t e  panel. Should both 
p a r t ie s  s t r i k e  the same name, the Commission would then s e le c t  the 
Chairman. With t h i s  done the Commission is  then te m p o ra r i l y  removed 
from the process and the Chairman assumes con t ro l  o f  the proceedings.
The Act has continued to  e v o lv e  by way of  amendments on an almost 
continuous basis. The l e g i s l a t u r e  in March, 1975 extended the Act 
i n d e f i n i t e l y  by repea l ing  the section which required the Act to  exp ire  
in June, 1975. Subsequent amendments a lso provided fo r  a d d i t io n a l  
s e rv ice  personnel being brought under con tro l  of the Act as w e l l  as 
minor procedural issues.
CHAPTER I I I  
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC ACT 312
A cons iderab le  number of  s tud ies have been devoted to ana lys is  of  
the e f fe c ts  o f  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  on the impact o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
barga in ing in the area o f  p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel. The studies have 
analyzed var ious aspects of  behavior^as w e l l  as problems which are 
sometimes bel ieved to accompany compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n .
During the debates held in s ta te  l e g is l a tu r e s  concerning 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n ,  both proponents and opponents o f  the 
l e g i s l a t i o n  questioned whether the existence of the l e g i s l a t i o n  would 
impair the nego t ia t ing  process a lready in p lace and working r e l a t i v e l y  
w e l l  in a la rge  m a jo r i t y  of cases. Numerous studies have shown 
concern fo r  both the subsequent lack of nego t ia t ion  as w e l l  as the 
subsequent re l ia n c e  on a r b i t r a t i o n  fo r  con trac t  reso lu t io ns .
Some i n d iv id u a l s  speaking on the top ic  f e l t  th a t  the mere 
presence of  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  would cause the pa r t ies  to s u f f e r  a 
" c h i l l i n g  e f fe c t " .  Negotiators  would be less in c l i n e d  to g ive  and 
take or ar ious po in ts  and p re fe r  to maintain o r i g i n a l ,  extreme 
p o s i t io n s  on the issues,
The stud ies have shown i t  to be important in d is t in g u is h in g  
whether convent ional  a r b i t r a t i o n  or some form of  f i n a l  o f f e r
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a r b i t r a t i o n  are used to determine the extent  o f  the " c h i l l i n g  e f fec t " .  
Convent ional a r b i t r a t i o n  could be defined as " the required submission 
o f  a bargain ing impasse to  a t h i r d  par ty  who fashions the award he 
deems proper on the issues " i n  d ispu te "  (F e u i l l e ,  1975, p. 303).
The " c h i l l i n g "  or d e te r re n t  e f f e c t  could be seen i f  the p a r t ie s
l o s t  t h e i r  ince n t ive  to  bargain in good f a i t h .
I f  e i t h e r  party , the argument goes, a n t ic ip a te s  
th a t  i t  w i l l  get more from the a r b i t r a t o r  than 
from a negot ia ted se t t lement,  i t  w i l l  have an 
in c e n t i v e  to avoid the t r a d e - o f f s  o f  good f a i t h  
barga in ing and w i l l  c l i n g  to  excessive or 
u n r e a l i s t i c  pos i t ions  in the hope of t i l t i n g  the
a r b i t r a t i o n  outcome in i t s  favor .  This lack  o f
hard bargain ing w i l l  occur because of  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  reduct ion in the costs of 
disagreement. Not on ly  w i l l  there be no s t r i k e  
costs, the u n c e r ta in t ie s  associated w i th  continued 
disagreement are reduced because o f  the usual 
compromise outcome: the a r b i t r a t o r  g ives less
than the union has asked fo r  and more than the 
employer has o f fe red .  ( F e u i l l e ,  1975, p. 309)
F ina l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  attempts to  increase the costs to the 
p a r t ie s  by e l im in a t in g  a r b i t r a l  d isc re t ion .  Faced w i th  having the 
a r b i t r a t o r  s e le c t in g  one o f f e r  or the other,  in theory  the sides w i l l  
move c lo s e r  together and create t h e i r  own set t lement.  Peter F e u i l l e  
(1975) made note of  t h i s  in re po r t ing  his f ind ing s  on the c h i l l i n g  
e f f e c t  as i t  r e la te s  to  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n .  While F e u i l l e  does 
not a c t u a l l y  s ta te  a preference between convent ional  and f i n a l  o f f e r  
a r b i t r a t i o n ,  h is  research does show th a t  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  not 
o n ly  negates the c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t  found in convent iona l  a r b i t r a t i o n ,
but a lso  reduces the number o f  issues to be decided by the a r b i t r a to r .
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A r b i t r a t i o n  awards as a p ropor t ion  o f  a l l  
se t t lements  in the f i n a l  o f f e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  are 
lower than the comparable award propor t ions  in the 
convent ional  j u r i s d i c t i o n s :  , „T h is  in fo rmat ion
suggests tha t  under f i n a l  o f f e r  procedures w i th  
e n t i r e  package s e le c t io n  the p a r t ie s  reduce the 
number of disputed issues and hence move c lo s e r  to  
a g rea te r  ex tent  than occurs under convent ional  
a r b i t r a t i o n  and under f i n a l  o f f e r  procedures with  
issue by issue se le c t io n ,  (Tables 1 and 2)
F e u i l l e  is  ca re fu l  to  note th a t  the p a r t i c u l a r  form chosen by the
p o l i c y  makers should r e f l e c t  the p r i o r i t i e s  they have es tab l ished  and
what they expect the law to  accomplish.
F i r s t ,  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  procedures appear 
to  do a somewhat b e t te r  job of  producing 
negot ia ted agreements than do convent ional  
a r b i t r a t i o n  procedures. I f  p o l i c y  makers p lace a 
higher p r i o r i t y  on negotia ted agreements than on 
imposed awards, the im p l i c a t io n  is  th a t  where 
a r b i t r a t i o n  is  deemed necessary f i n a l  o f f e r  
procedures should be implemented instead o f  
convent ional  ones. However, i f  p o l i c y  makers are 
i n d i f f e r e n t  between negotia ted and imposed 
outcomes, there  is  no reason fo r  them to p re fe r  
the f i n a l  o f f e r  process, Second, d i f f e r e n t  
bargain ing behaviors may r e s u l t  from d i f f e r e n t  
s e le c t io n  dec is ion ru le s ,  Package se le c t io n  
increases the " a l l  or nothing" r i s k  o f  not 
reaching a negotia ted agreement on a l l  the issues; 
issue s e le c t io n  decreases the r i s k  attached to not 
reaching agreement on any p a r t i c u l a r  issue.
However, the -p re fe r red  se le c t io n  r u le  cannot be 
spec i f ied  w i thou t  f i r s t  knowing the p o l i c y  makers' 
p r i o r i t i e s  (e.g., to  maximize the in c e n t i v e  to 
move together,  to  minimize the chance of 
in e q u i ta b le  a r b i t r a t i o n  awards, etc,).  In short,  
the normat ive conclusions tha t  people reach about 
the existence and shape o f  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  
procedures w i l l  depend on the p r i o r i t i e s  they 
attach to var ious outcomes, ( F e u i l l e .  1975, p,
309)
Charles Feigenbaum (1975) agrees w i th  F e u i l l e  on the p o te n t ia l  
f o r  the " c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t "  to  a f f e c t  nego t ia t ions  in cases of i n t e r e s t
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a r b i t r a t i o n ,  but concludes th a t  the f i n a l - o f f e r  approach is  not the 
s o lu t io n .  A f te r  examining awards in Michigan, Wisconsin, Eugene, 
Oregon and Ind ianapo l is ,  Indiana. Feigenbaum made two conclusions.
Mediat ion and f u r t h e r  nego t ia t ions  must be a l lowed and encouraged 
even a f t e r  the a r b i t r a t i o n  process is  invoked. By a l lo w in g  th is ,  as 
w e l l  as g i v in g  the a r b i t r a t o r  g reate r  f l e x i b i l i t y  in making the award, 
p a r t ie s  would be encouraged to a r r i v e  at a negot ia ted sett lement.
This should a lso  lend i t s e l f  to  the rendering o f  a q u a l i t y  dec is ion 
should a negot ia ted set t lement be unat ta inab le .
Lipsky and Barocci (1978) studied the " c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t "  in 
Massachusetts from the perspect ive  of  p re - law  and pos t- law  periods.
The pre- law  period encompassed the years o f  1972-1974 w h i le  the post­
law per iod covered 1975-1975 (see Table 3), The number o f  impasses 
increased approx imate ly  70%, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f i r e  157%, p o l ic e  85% and 
teachers 33%.
Lipsky and Barocci however exercised great caution in using th i s  
to  determine the existence or strength of a " c h i l l i n g  e f fe c t " .  They 
noted numerous changes in the bargaining environment, such as 
sh r in k ing  munic ipal budgets, increases in unemployment, as w e l l  as 
higher ra tes o f  i n f l a t i o n .  They be l ieved  tha t  an important  t e s t  was 
not the number o f  cases th a t  went to  impasse, but ra ther  the number 
which were completed with  a formal award. In F isca l  1975, less than 
9% of  a l l  p o l i c e  and f i r e  bargain ing un i ts  resorted to a r b i t r a t i o n .
In F isca l  1975, the f ig u re  was on ly  2%.
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The ir  conc lus ion was th a t  w h i le  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  led to a 
g rea te r  r e l ia n c e  on a r b i t r a t i o n ,  i t  d id  not lead to a la rge  number o f  
formal awards being issued. The cases were s e t t le d  at some po in t  in 
the process before an award became necessary,
Craig A. Olson (1979) made use o f  recent case stud ies in an 
attempt to conclude whether f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  encouraged good 
f a i t h  bargain ing th a t  was o b v io u s ly  " c h i l l e d "  by convent ional  
a r b i t r a t i o n .  Using the State o f  Wisconsin and the years 1973-1977, 
Olson a r r ived  at a v a r ie t y  of  conclus ions.
I n i t i a l l y ,  the assistance of an a r b i t r a t o r  was needed in 35% o f  
a l l  the negot ia t ions .  A formal award by an a r b i t r a t o r  was required in 
o n ly  14% o f  the cases. The remainder were s e t t le d  w i th  the 
a r b i t r a t o r ' s  assistance p r io r  to  the issuance o f  a formal award.
Olson a lso  examined the number of  issues which were in v o lve d  in 
the formal award through 1976, I t  was found tha t  32% o f  a l l  f i n a l  
awards had only one issue wh i le  76% had three or fewer issues.
Studies a lso  demonstrated th a t  the use o f  a r b i t r a t i o n  in 
Wisconsin increased four  years in a row u n t i l  i t  appeared to l e v e l  o f f  
in 1977, Olson be l ie ved  th a t  the p a r t i c ip a n ts  had gained experience 
w i th  the new law and f in d in g  i t  to be no panacea, s imply  chose to 
s e t t l e  w i thou t  invok ing the process.
Studies done in the State of New Jersey by J e f f r e y  3, Tener 
(1982) have found p o s i t i v e  re s u l t s  in t h i s  area, Tener notes tha t  the 
system o f  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  has "worked w e l l " ,  not ing the la rge 
number o f  v o lu n ta ry  set t lements  w i thou t  work stoppages, wage increases
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seemingly in r e l a t i o n  to the cost o f  l i v i n g ,  and l i t t l e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
support to  repeal the lav/. The number o f  formal awards has decreased 
each year, appearing to prove tha t  the emphasis on v o lu n ta ry
se t t lements  appears to be v/orking.
Robert Emmet Murray (1982) found s im i l a r  r e s u l t s  in his
examination th a t  i n t e r e s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  appears to be working w e l l  f o r
a l l  pa r t ies .  Murray s ta tes tha t :
. . . rea l  nego t ia t ions  during med-arb are 
enhanced... I n te re s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  represents the 
beginning of  the end. A r b i t r a to r s  have great
a u th o r i t y  in t h e i r  capac i ty  as mediators, and
under f i n a l  o f f e r  procedures, the pa r t ie s  are 
given a d e f i n i t e  in c e n t iv e  to modify t h e i r  
bargain ing pos i t ions .  F a i lu re  to  do so may w e l l  
mean loss of  the e n t i r e  economic case.
Murray a lso  s ta tes  tha t  " f i n a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  cases are not won, 
they are lo s t . "  I t  was found th a t  in analyz ing awards and 
in te rv ie w in g  the a r b i t r a to r s ,  the le a s t  unreasonable o f f e r  is  
se lected,  not the most reasonable. A r b i t r a to r s  often chose the lea s t  
o f f e n s iv e  o f f e r ,  decid ing th a t  o f fe rs  which were too extreme would 
a u to m a t i c a l l y  be excluded. This in tu rn would lead to more reasonable 
proposals by the p a r t ie s  because an unreasonable proposal would cause 
t h e i r  pa r ty  to lose a u to m a t ic a l l y .
The c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t ' s  t ru e  impact is  more e a s i l y  examined by 
re f e r r i n g  to Table 1, The ta b le  is  d iv ided  in to  two parts , 
convent iona l  a r b i t r a t i o n  and f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Two general 
conclus ions can be observed from the data which are presented. 
I n i t i a l l y ,  more cases of  a r b i t r a t i o n  requests and dec is ions are found
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TABLE 1
Conventional and Final O f fe r  Experiences Compared
Proport ion o f  
negoti  a t i  on 
cases in which 
arbi  t r a t i o n  
was invoked 
(per cent)
Proport ion o f  
cases which 
resu l ted  in 




o f  
time
Number o f  
n e go t ia t i  on 
cases 
i nvolved
Conventional a r b i t r a t i o n :  
(1) Canadian federa l
(2)
government 
B r i t i s h  Columbia
32 18 1967-74 305









(3) Ontario  (Canada) 
pub l ic  hosp i ta ls






(4) Pennsylvania pub l ic  
sa fe ty
n.a. 1. Approx. 1. 
40-50









(5) Michigan pub l ic  
safe ty
29 19 1969-71 327
(6) F i r e f i g h te r s  in 37 27 1970-72 Several







p r o f i t  hosp i ta ls
Final o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n :
n.a. 19 1947-69 n.a.

















(10) Eugene (Oregon) 
c i t y  government
55 33 1972-75 9








Sources f o r  rows: (see fo l lo w in g  page)
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Sources f o r  rows:
(1) John F’inkelman, " t h a t ' s  New in Dispute Resolut ion Techniques," 
paper presented at  the Second Annual Convention o f  the Society o f  
Profess iona ls  in Dispute Resolu t ion, Chicago, November 12, 1974, p. 5.
(2) Mark Thompson and James C a i rn ie ,  "Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n :
The Case o f  B r i t i s h  Columbia Teachers," I n d u s t r ia l  and Labor Relat ions 
Review, XXVII (October, 1973), 12.
(3) Robert J. Hines, "Mandatory Contract A r b i t r a t i o n — Is I t  a 
V iab le  Process?" In d u s t r ia l  and Labor Relat ions Review, XXV (J u ly ,  
1972), 536.
(4) M o l l ie  H. Bowers, A Study o f  Leg is la ted In t e r e s t  A r b i t r a t i o n  
and C o l le c t i v e  Bargaining in the Public Safety Services in  Michigan 
and Pennsylvania. Ph.D. d i s s e r ta t i o n ,  Cornel l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  1974, p.
220; and M o l l ie  H. Bowers, "A P rac t ica l  Appraisal o f  Leg is la ted  
A r b i t r a t i o n  in the Publ ic  Sector , "  unpublished manuscr ip t,  September, 
1974, p. 64.
(5) Bowers, A Study o f  Legis la ted In te re s t  A r b i t r a t i o n    p. 180.
(6) Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n :  A 'N a rco t ic
E f f e c t ' ? "  In d u s t r ia l  R e la t io ns , XIV (February, 1975), 119. These 
s ta tes  (and years) inc lude Michigan (1970-1971), Nebraska (1971-1972), 
Nevada (1971-1972), Pennsylvania (1970-1971), South Dakota (1971-1972), 
and Wyoming (1970-1972), so there is  some overlap w i th  the data in  rows 
(4) and (5 ) .  Unl ike the actual count data in  the o ther  rows, the row 
(6) data is  based on est imates o f  the to t a l  number o f  f i r e f i g h t e r  
ne go t ia t ions  in these states during these years.
(7) Bowers, A Study o f  Leg is la ted In te re s t  A r b i t r a t i o n . . . . , p. 181.
(8) Charles M. Rehmus, " Is  a 'F ina l  O f fe r '  Ever F ina l?"  Monthly
Labor Review, XCVII (September, 1974), 45; Charles M. Rehmus,
"Leg is la ted  In te re s t  A r b i t r a t i o n . " Proceedings o f  the Twenty-Seventh 
Annual Winter Meeting o f  the In d u s t r ia l  Relat ions Research Assoc ia t ion ,  
San Francisco, C a l i f o r n ia ,  December 1974 (Madison, Wise.: In d u s t r ia l  
Relat ions Research Assoc ia t ion ,  1975), p. 313; and Charles M. Rehmus, 
"The Final O f fe r  A rb i t r a t i o n  Example," PERB News, New York State Publ ic  
Employment Relat ions Board, V I I I  (January, 1 975), 2-3.
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(9) James L. Stern , "F inal  O f fe r  A r b i t r a t i o n - - I n i t i a l  Experience 
in Wisconsin." Monthly Labor Review, XCVII (September, 1974), 40; 
and Rehmus, "Leg is la ted  In te re s t  A r b i t r a t i o n . "  p. 313.
(10) Gary Long and Peter F e u i l l e ,  "F inal  O f fe r  A r b i t r a t i o n :  
'Sudden Death' in Eugene." In d u s t r ia l  and Labor Relat ions Review, 
XXVII (January, 1974), 196; and Gary Long, telephone conversat ion,  
February 24, 1975.
(11) Correspondence from Marvin M i l l e r ,  Executive D i re c to r  o f  
the Major League Baseball Players Assoc ia t ion ,  to the author,
A p r i l  10, 1974.
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in areas using convent iona l  a r b i t r a t i o n  than in areas which use f i n a l  
o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n .  This would r e f l e c t  the perception o f  more 
a r b i t r a t i o n  when the " r i s k s "  are perceived as being 1ower.
Secondly, there are more cases of  a r b i t r a t i o n  in the e a r l y  years 
o f  the law's existence than in l a t e r  years a f t e r  the law has been 
enacted. This would tend to support the premise th a t  both sides of  
the bargaining t a b le  may have t r i e d  the process s imply  to  see how they 
would fare. A f te r  f in d in g  i t  to  be less than pe r fec t ,  they returned 
to  negot ia ted se t t lements  in a la rg e r  percentage o f  cases. In the 
area o f  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  in the p u b l ic  sector, i t  is  noted th a t  
approx imate ly  10% of  a l l  nego t ia t ions  in which a r b i t r a t i o n  had been 
invoked ended in an a r b i t r a te d  sett lement.
The " c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t "  as i t  r e la te s  to Michigan has yet  to  be 
addressed d i r e c t l y .  One could assume Michigan's experience would 
p a r a l l e l  those experiences of other states such as Wisconsin and New 
Jersey, w i th  s i m i l a r  l e g i s l a t i o n  and populat ions. This is  a 
reasonable assumption due to the lack of  studies s ta t in g  f ind ing s  to 
the  con tra ry .
Compulsory i n te r e s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  is a lso  be l ieved  to have an 
impact on the a t t i t u d e s  o f  the opposing par t ies .  One of  the most 
important  cons idera t ions  in t h i s  area deals w i th  the "Narcotic  
E f fec t " .  The Narcot ic  E f fe c t 's  basic premise is  th a t  the two pa r t ies  
in a labor  d ispute  w i l l  come to  r e l y  more and more on the a r b i t r a t i o n  
process in p lace o f  good f a i t h ,  hard c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining. In 
essence, they would become addicted to t h i s  easy way out.
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With r e l a t i v e l y  l im i t e d  in fo rm a t ion ,  Hoyt N. Wheeler (1975)
attempted to  ascer ta in  i f  there was in fa c t  a na rco t ic  e f f e c t  on
c o l l e c t i v e  barga in ing a f t e r  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  laws were in place.
In the study, Wheeler found considerab le  evidence of the na rco t ic
e f f e c t ,  but did not suggest t h i s  was ne cessa r i ly  undesirable in
comparison to s t r i k e s .  Rather, he found th a t  eve ry th ing  is  r e l a t i v e ,
and must be considered in i t s  e n t i r e t y  before reaching conclusions.
Under compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n ,  an average o f  37.3 
per cent of  the f i r e  f i g h t e r  nego t ia t ions  per year 
in  each s ta te  re su l te d  in the i n s t i t u t i o n  of  
a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings. In those sta tes which 
had fa c t  f i n d in g  laws, 21.5 per cent of  the f i r e  
f i g h t e r  nego t ia t ions  went to  fa c t  f ind ing .  In 
those sta tes which had v o lu n ta r y  a r b i t r a t i o n  or 
both fa c t  f i n d in g  and v o lu n ta ry  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  on ly  
2.1 per cent o f  the nego t ia t ions  re su l ted  in the 
use of these impasse-resol u t ion  procedures.-.Under 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n ,  an average o f  26.8 per 
cent o f  f i r e  f i g h t e r  nego t ia t ions  per year in each 
s ta te  ended in an award. In f a c t  f i n d in g  states,
12.9 per cent of  the negot ia t ions  produced the 
issuance o f  a fa c t  f in d e r 's  report.  In sta tes 
which had v o lu n ta ry  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  or both fa c t  
f i n d in g  and v o lu n ta ry  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  o n ly  2.1 per 
cent o f  the nego t ia t ions  resu l ted  in the issuance 
o f  an a r b i t r a t o r ' s  award or a fa c t  f in d e r 's  
re po r t .
In Michigan and Pennsylvania, both of  which had 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  laws, an average o f  53.9 
per cent o f  f i r e  f i g h t i n g  negot ia t ions  per year 
in each s ta te  re su l ted  in the i n s t i t u t i o n  of  
a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings. In I l l i n o i s ,
Connecticut , New Jersey, New York, and 
Massachusetts, which had fa c t  f in d in g  laws, an 
average of  o n ly  25,7 per cent of  these 
nego t ia t ions  per year in each s ta te  resu l ted  in 
the i n s t i t u t i o n  of f a c t  f in d in g  proceedings,
(Wheeler, 1975, pp. 119-120)
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Whi le suppor t ing the presence of  the n a rco t ic  e f f e c t ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
must be made in regards to a l l  these f ind ings .  Wheeler a lso  
emphasized th a t  most o f  the s ta tes  w i th  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  laws 
had o n ly  re c e n t l y  begun t h e i r  use of  the law. Both management and 
union a l i k e  were s imply  t r y in g  out the new laws to  see how they would 
fa re  under the new p rov is ions .  Nei ther management or union was at an 
advantage or disadvantage in t h i s  respect.
Both sides had the same in fo rmat ion  in regards to the process.
The unions had f e l t  f o r  a long t ime th a t  t h e i r  requests f o r  be t te r  
wages and working cond i t ions  had been kept i n o r d in a te l y  below t h e i r  
counterpar ts  in the p r i v a te  sector  and had l i t t l e  to  lose by going to 
a r b i t r a t i o n .  Management would not agree to large wage increases 
v o l u n t a r i l y  and f e l t  a r b i t r a t i o n  o f fe red  them no less than an even 
chance to maintain the s ta tus quo.
C o n f l i c t s  in Studies on the Narcot ic  E f fec t
Thomas Kochan and Jean Baderschneider (1978) found a subs tan t ia l  
na rco t ic  e f f e c t  in the State o f  New York a f t e r  the enactment o f  the 
T a y lo r  Lav/, and t h e i r  evidence showed a pa t te rn  of  dependence on the 
process. These same r e s u l t s  were l a t e r  confirmed by Richard J. B u t le r  
and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (1981) when they also studied the Taylor Law.
B u t le r  and Ehrenberg d i f f e r e d  however in respect to  the length of  
the n a rco t ic  e f f e c t ,  in th a t  the na rco t ic  e f f e c t  may on ly  be 
" p o s i t i v e "  f o r  the f i r s t  few rounds of  negot ia t ions.  A p o s i t i v e  
n a rco t ic  e f f e c t  was defined as the s i t u a t io n  in which pa r t ies  were
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more in c l i n e d  to  go to a r b i t r a t i o n  because o f  the law's ex istence, 
then they would be i f  the law were not on record. A negat ive n a rco t ic  
e f f e c t  would be defined as when pa r t ie s  would be less l i k e l y  to go to 
a r b i t r a t i o n  because of  the law's exis tence.
B u t le r  and Ehrenberg found th a t  a f t e r  going through the 
a r b i t r a t i o n  process on two or three occasions and having an a r b i t r a t o r  
decide aga inst  them on c r i t i c a l  po ints  and issues, some pa r t ies  no 
longer  cared fo r  the unce r ta in t ies  o f  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Impasse had become 
too expensive, and the uncer ta in ty  of winning the issue in a r b i t r a t i o n  
proceedings too great.
3 u t l e r  and Ehrenberg found th a t  some groups merely wanted to t e s t  
the new law and ascerta in  whether they could expect a b e t te r  con t rac t  
from the a r b i t r a t o r  than from c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining. Finding the 
r e s u l t s  too often to be less than per fec t ,  and consider ing the costs 
in t ime and money, they simply chose to avoid the process in l a t e r  
rounds of  negot ia t ions.
In conclusion, both the studies done by Kochan and Baderschneider 
(1978) and B u t le r  and Ehrenberg (1981) agreed as to an i n i t i a l  
p o s i t i v e  na rco t ic  e f fe c t .  Kochan and Baderschneider however 
maintained th i s  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  continued on in to  l a t e r  nego t ia t ions  
wh i le  B u t le r  and Ehrenberg contended tha t  i t  diminished s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
James R. Chelius and Marian M. E x te j t  (1985) sought to  review and 
analyze the evidence and counter claims in an attempt to  re so lve  the 
issue of  whether a narco t ic  e f f e c t  ex is ts  in l a t e r  bargain ing years. 
The i r  conclus ions supported B u t le r  and Ehrenberg in tha t ,  given an
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i n i t i a l  period of  adjustment to  a new law, no p o s i t i v e  e f fe c ts  were 
observed. In ad d i t ion ,  o n ly  scat te red negat ive e f f e c ts  were observed 
in l a t e r  years. Any p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  at a l l  was l im i te d  s t r i c t l y  to 
the e a r l y  years and were exaggerated even then.
Harold Newman, Chairman of  the Mew York State Pub l ic  Employment
Re la t ions  Board a lso  supported B u t le r  and Ehrenberg's contention.  In
December, 1982. Newman stated:
Over the years we have heard the cry  repeated w i th  
t i resome redundancy regarding the " c h i l l i n g "  or 
" n a rc o t ic "  e f f e c t  th a t  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a r b i t r a t i o n  
provides. Last year, in New York, on ly  18 p o l ic e  
and f i r e  f i g h t e r  cases went to  a r b i t r a t i o n  and 
they represented 11 percent o f  the t o t a l  
nego t ia t ions  i n v o l v i n g  pol icemen and f i r e  f i g h te r s  
th a t  took p lace in 1981 in the state.
Furthermore, a r b i t r a t i o n  awards provided sm a l le r  
wage set t lements  f o r  p o l i c e  and f i r e  than those 
th a t  were achieved by t h e i r  unions at the 
bargain ing tab le ,  Myths d ie  hard, but our 
s t a t i s t i c s  are harder s t i l l .  ( A r b i t r a t i o n  
Journal,  December, 1982. p, 8)
The th r u s t  o f  Newman's statement appears to  be c le a r  and concise. 
The fac ts  at le a s t  in New York State do not support any notion of  a 
" c h i l l i n g "  or " n a rc o t ic "  e f fe c t .  The mere fa c t  th a t  the " c h i l l i n g "  
and "n a rc o t ic "  e f fe c ts .h a v e  received so much a t te n t io n  does not make 
them important fac to rs  in the abs t rac t  process,
The na rco t ic  e f f e c t  can be e a s i l y  counted by re fe r r in g  to  the 
data in Table 2, In the years of 1969-1971, the median number of 
issues taken to convent ional  a r b i t r a t i o n  was e leven fo r  po l ic e  and 
tw e lv e  and o n e -h a l f  f o r  f i r e  personnel. In the years of 1973-1974 
under f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  the number o f  issues was twe lve  on an
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TABLE 2
Range and Number of  A r b i t r a t i o n I ssues
Conventional j u r i s d i c t i o n s  Final o f f e r j u r i  sdi c t i  ons
(1)
Mi chi gan 








pub l ic  sa fe ty  
(package 
se le c t ion )
(4)
Mi chi gan 
pub l ic  safe ty  
( issue 
se le c t ion )
Median or average 
number o f  issues 
taken to  a r b i t r a t i o n  
in se lected cases
11-p o l i  ce 








Number o f  cases 
inc luded in  analys is
at  leas t  
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110 23 14
Period o f  time 1969-1971 1968-1971 1972-1974 1973-1974
Sources f o r  columns:
(1) M o l l ie  H. Bowers, A Study o f  Leg is la ted In te re s t :  A r b i t r a t i o n  
in the Public  Safety Services in Michigan and Pennsylvania. Ph.D. 
d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Cornel l  U n iv e rs i t y ,  1974, pp. 126, 159.
(2) Bowers, op. c i t . ,  pp. 209, 213.
(3) James L. Stern, "F inal O f fe r  A r b i t r a t i o n - - I n i t i a l  Experience in 
Wisconsin."  Monthly Labor Review, XCVII (September, 1974), 42.
(4) Robert C. Howlett ,  "Experiences wi th  Last O f fe r  A r b i t r a t i o n - -  
M ichigan,"  paper presented at the annual meeting o f  the Assoc ia t ion
o f  Labor Mediat ion Agencies, July 31, 1974, p. 4.
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average. There was no tendency shown by the two sides to bargain wi th  
any less enthusiasm and s imply  l e t  the a r b i t r a t o r  decide the issues 
and t h e i r  dec is ions f o r  the pa r t ie s .
The C h i l l i n g  and Narcot ic  E f fec ts  in Michigan
S p ec i f ic  s tudies on the impact o f  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  on 
nego t ia t ions  and a t t i t u d e s  in Michigan are d i f f i c u l t  to  locate. The 
Department of Labor and the Department of  Management and Budget noted 
in a study e n t i t l e d  Review o f  Michigan's Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n  Act, 
P u b l ic  Act 312 of 1969, submitted May 21, 1979, did attempt to  address 
the  issue.
C i t in g  stud ies by Dr. Charles Rehmus, Chairman of  the Michigan 
Employment Re la t ions Commission, the review f inds  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
a r b i t r a t i o n  to have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining. Rehmus 
noted th a t  la rge c i t i e s  have unique problems such as race, strong 
p o l i t i z a t i o n  and a shr ink ing  tax base as the issues which encourage 
a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings.
I t  was a lso  noted tha t  in a study by Ernst 3enjamin e n t i t l e d  
" F in a l - O f f e r  A r b i t r a t i o n  Awards in Michigan, 1973-1977," Benjamin 
noted th a t  the percent of vo lu n ta ry  sett lements  had in fa c t  increased 
w i th  the incep t ion  of  f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  in 1973, 3enjamin 
however was care fu l  to note tha t :
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Nei ther  pa r ty  has seen a r b i t r a t i o n  as a panacea, 
but ( th a t )  does n e c e ssa r i ly  d isp rove  the view th a t  
p u b l i c  management is  s e t t l i n g  high out o f  fea r  of  
a r b i t r a t i o n .  However, i f  a r b i t r a t i o n  awards were 
in f a c t  g e n e r a l l y  pro-union,  we would expect an 
increas ing number o f  union lo c a ls  to i n s i s t  on 
a r b i t r a t i o n  and t h i s  has not occurred.
CHAPTER IV
PROPOSED CHANGES IN PUBLIC ACT 312 BY VARIOUS GROUPS
As w i th  most any law in e f f e c t  in Michigan today, Pub l ic  Act 312 
has both proponents and opponents. On one extreme, some would p re fe r  
to  see the groups o f  workers covered by the law expanded to inc lude 
other  p u b l i c  secto r  personnel such as teachers and san i ta ry  workers. 
Others s t i l l  would p re fe r  to  see the law repealed in i t s  e n t i re ty .  
Whi le there appears to be l i t t l e  support f o r  e i t h e r  extreme, there 
does appear to  be some support to  amend the law in a v a r ie t y  o f  ways.
On the one extreme, some municipal o f f i c i a l s  and researchers 
are convinced th a t  P ub l ic  Act 312 is  f i r s t  and foremost 
u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l ,  even though the s ta te  supreme court  has ru led  
otherwise. They have questioned whether the power of  taxa t ion  can be 
surrendered, suspended, or contracted away by any piece of  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  Questions have a lso  been raised as to whether 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers granted to the c i t i e s  under home r u le  have in 
fa c t  been denied to the c i t i e s  by t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n .
Another issue in v o lv e s  whether compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  represents 
an u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l  de lega t ion  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  and execut ive  branch 
power to  p r i v a te  persons as w e l l  as whether the Act surrenders to the 
panel of  a r b i t r a t o r s  the power to tax. These were in f a c t  the issues
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ra ised in a law su i t  e n t i t l e d  Dearborn F i re  F ighters  Union Local No. 
412, IAFF, v. C i ty  o f  Dearborn (1972). The Michigan Court o f  Appeals 
a f f i rmed th a t  the Act was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and the Michigan Supreme 
Court s p l i t  4-4 as to the Act 's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ,  a l lo w in g  the Court 
o f  Appeals' v e r d i c t  to  stand.
F a i l i n g  to  repeal the Act on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  basis, c a l l s  of  
a b o l ish in g  the law through the l e g i s l a t i v e  process soon came to  be 
heard. Most o f  these c a l l s  are being heard from the M e tropo l i tan  
D e t r o i t  area m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  who have perceived themselves as los ing  
f a r  more issues than they have won in the process. There has been 
almost no pub l ic  support f o r  Publ ic Act 312's repeal.
U i th  l i t t l e  l i k e l i h o o d  of repeal of Pub l ic  Act 312, what then are 
some o f  the more l i k e l y  changes which may be invoked to " improve" the 
process? As demonstrated e a r l i e r  in t h i s  paper, there are extremes on 
both sides as w e l l  as a more moderate approach to change.
On the one end o f  the spectrum, the Michigan Municipal  League 
presented i t s  vers ion of needed changes during i t s  89th annual 
convention which was held September 9-11, 1987 in D e t ro i t ,  Michigan.
The Employee Relat ions Committee proposed the f o l l o w in g
amendments:
4. Employee R e la tions  Committee 
4-A. Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n
1. The Michigan Municipal League urges th a t  Act 
312 of 1969, the P o l ic e -F i re  Compulsory 
A r b i t r a t i o n  Act, be amended to:
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a) prov ide fo r  access to  the Act 312 
procedure o n ly  in the event of  a t rue 
barga in ing impasse wi th  a l im i te d  number of 
issues, and so c e r t i f i e d  by the State
rned i a t o r ;
b) p rov ide fo r  a r b i t r a to r s  w i th  more 
t r a in in g  and experience p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i th  
respect to  knowledge of  loca l  government;
c) p rov ide fo r  an o b je c t i v e  system o f  
a r b i t r a t o r  s e le c t io n  from a l i s t  of f i v e  
names;
d) prov ide fo r  t o t a l  package f i n a l  
o f fe r ,  to  be i r re v o c a b ly  exchanged by the 
p a r t ie s  and submitted to the mediator p r i o r  
to  the a r b i t r a t i o n  hearings wi th  op t iona l  
procedures fo r  convent ional  a r b i t r a t i o n  or
issue-by- issue f i n a l  o f fe r ,  by mutual 
agreement;
e) e n t i t l e  e i t h e r  pa r ty  to convene a 
pre-hear ing conference or a post-hearing 
conference of the a r b i t r a t i o n  panel;
f )  requ ire  tha t  the a r b i t r a t i o n  panel 
not be al lowed to issue an award th a t  would 
increase the cost to the loca l  u n i t  o f  
government w i thout  f i r s t  determining th a t  the 
loca l  u n i t  of government has the a b i l i t y  to 
pay such award, whenever such a b i l i t y  to  pay 
is  disputed;
g) requ ire  tha t  the Michigan Employment 
Re la t ions  Commission review, w i th in  a 
spe c i f ied  t ime l i m i t ,  each Act 312 
a r b i t r a t i o n  award to assure tha t  i t  is  in 
compliance wi th  Act 312; and
h) requ ire  tha t  the Michigan Employment 
Re la t ions  Commission pub l ish ,  at State 
expense, a l l  Act 312 awards and make them 
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b le  to the pub l ic .
2. The Michigan Municipal League urges the 
Michigan Employment Relat ions Commission 
(MERC) to promulgate and adopt formal ru le s  
and regu la t ions  regarding the adm in is t ra t ion  
o f  P.A. 312 o f  1 969. Such r u l e s  and 
regu la t ions  should inc lude:
a) minimum standards f o r  the appointment 
of  a r b i t r a to r s  to MERC's panel o f  Act 312 
arbi t r a to r s .
b) a procedure fo r  the t r a in in g  
requirements of Act 312 a rb i t r a to r s .
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c) an o b je c t i v e  procedure f o r  the 
s e le c t io n  from the panel of  a r b i t r a t o r  
nominees f o r  i n d iv id u a l  cases.
d) the r i g h t  of  e i t h e r  pa r ty  to r e je c t  
the f i r s t  l i s t  o f  a r b i t r a t o r  nominees 
se lec ted by MERC.
e) a requirement th a t  the b iograph ica l  
sketches on the a r b i t r a t o r s  inc lude  more 
in fo rm a t ion  in c lu d in g  a record of  the cases 
in which the a r b i t r a t o r  has p re v io u s ly  served 
as a neutra l  in  d isputes i n v o l v i n g  Michigan 
p u b l i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
f )  a p ro v is io n  tha t ,  i f  requested by 
e i t h e r  pa r ty  to  an Act 312 a r b i t r a t i o n ,  a 
pre-hear ing conference is  required and a 
post-hear ing conference of  the a r b i t r a t i o n  
panel is  a lso  required in order to c l a r i f y  
the issues and expedite the process.
g) a requirement th a t  the l a s t  best 
o f fe rs  o f  the pa r t ie s  conta in the s p e c i f i c  
language o f  the proposed con t rac t  section or 
sect ions and th a t  the a r b i t r a t o r  inc lude  the 
s p e c i f i c  con t rac t  language in the award,
h) a p ro v is io n  th a t  MERC w i l l  designate 
ad hoc mediators, when se lected by the 
pa r t ies ,  to  expedite the se t t lem en t  o f
di sputes.
i )  procedures to ensure tha t  the time 
l i m i t s  o f  Act 312 are fo l lowed.
Upon i n i t i a l  examination, the amendments appear to  be qu i te
l im i t e d  in nature when the e x is t in g  l e g i s l a t i o n  is  so much more
extens ive.  Some of  the changes have drawn l i t t l e  oppos i t ion,  w h i le
s t i l l  others  have enjoyed wide support. Some are a l ready  in the
present law, but in d i f f e r e n t  words wi th  more or less emphasis than is
now suggested in the amendments.
Few from e i t h e r  side of  the bargain ing ta b le  would argue wi th  any
o f  the f i r s t  f i v e  items (a-e) found in Section 1. Everyone would
p re fe r  a bargained se t t lemen t  instead of  any awarded set t lement,  but
should an awarded se t t lem en t  be the on ly  way to  reso lve  an impasse,
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the award should be made by an in d iv id u a l  w i th  s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge 
and expe r t ise  in the area to decide the issues i n t e l l i g e n t l y .  Raising 
the number o f  p rospec t ive  a r b i t r a t o r s  from three to f i v e  should a lso  
cause no p a r t i c u l a r  advantage fo r  one side over the o ther side.
Section 1d p rov id ing  fo r  t o t a l  package f i n a l  o f f e r  to  be 
i r r e v o c a b l y  exchanged and submitted before a r b i t r a t i o n  is  a 
s ub s tan t ia l  change from the present form now used in a r b i t r a t i o n  
hearings. I t  does not appear to be t i l t e d  in fa v o r  of one side over 
the o ther side and a lso  a l low s  f o r  op t iona l  procedures to be used i f  
both p a r t ie s  agree.
Some scho lars such as Charles M. Rehmus, who is  a strong advocate 
o f  the Med-Arb system, would s u re ly  have ser ious reserva t ions  wi th  
t h i s  point.  Rehmus as w e l l  as others are strong b e l ie v e rs  in both 
sides being a l lowed to modify t h e i r  pos i t ions  as the hearing 
progresses, thereby increasing the chances of  a negotia ted set t lement.
G iv ing  e i t h e r  par ty  the r i g h t  to a pre-hear ing or post-hearing 
conference of  the a r b i t r a t i o n  panel should cause l i t t l e  d is ru p t io n  or 
t ime delay. The pre-hearing conference could help in avo id ing 
a r b i t r a t i o n  in the present dispute,  w h i le  a post-hear ing conference 
could help in avo id ing a r b i t r a t i o n  during the next round of  
negot i  a t i  ons.
Section I f  however is  a rad ica l  change from the present law.
This would s i g n i f i c a n t l y  change the " a b i l i t y  to pay" question and 
p lace the burden of  proof on the panel to  prove the m u n ic ip a l i t y  has 
the a b i l i t y  to  pay the award. 3y merely ra is in g  the issue, the
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m u n ic ip a l i t y  appears to  be o f f  the hook in being required to prov ide 
f u r t h e r  in fo rm at ion .
As e a r l y  as 1930, the issue o f  a b i l i t y  to  pay and i t s  var ious 
c r i t e r i a  were a l ready  being examined. Dr. Charles T. Weber concluded 
tha t :  "... lack  o f  a b i l i t y  to  pay is  g e n e r a l l y  not absolute, but
r e l a t i v e . "  Therefore, w h i le  acknowledging th a t  the a b i l i t y  to  pay 
should not ne c e s s a r i ly  lead to  u n l im i te d  pay increases, i t  was a lso 
noted th a t :
When c i t i z e n s  re fuse to  vote to assume the burden 
required to pay t h e i r  employees a " f a i r  wage," i t  
i s  not the a b i l i t y ,  but the w i l l  to  pay tha t  is  
lack ing  and should not be a l lowed as a defense in 
a r b i t r a t i o n  nor accepted in negot ia t ions .  (Weber,
1980, p, 220)
In add i t ion ,  Weber a lso  notes th a t  p o te n t ia l  sources o f  funding could
be inadequate ly  u t i l i z e d ,  the re fo re  hu r t ing  the m u n ic ip a l i t i e s '
a b i l i t y  to  pay (p. 220).
Howard G. Foster (1984) concurred w i th  the study done by Weber
and a lso  added more s p e c i f i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  the a r b i t r a t o r  could be
faced w i th  i n a b i l i t y  to  pay quest ions.
Foster s ta tes :
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i t  is  submitted here th a t  a 
neu t ra l  cannot incorpora te  the a b i l i t y  to pay 
standard in to  h is dec is iona l  matr ix  w i thou t  making 
judgments about the appropr ia te  l e v e l  and 
charac te r  o f  p u b l i c  serv ices  in a community. I 
s t r o n g ly  suspect th a t  most c i t i z e n s  in the 
community would be w h o l l y  u n w i l l i n g  to defer those 
judgments to him or her i f  presented the choice in 
any other context. I al so suspect tha t  the vast 
m a jo r i t y  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s  who have voted fo r  
f a c t f i n d in g  and a r b i t r a t i o n  procedures had no 
in te n t io n  whatever o f  pe rm i t t in g  ou ts iders  to  make
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such judgments about the p r o v is io n  o f  p u b l i c  
serv ices .  Yet, In spec i fy ing  a b i l i t y  to  pay as a 
c r i t e r i o n  In wage determinat ion,  they have 
e f f e c t i v e l y  t h r u s t  tha t  very r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on the 
o u ts id e r .  (pp. 123-124)
I t  would a lso  seem lo g ic a l  to  assume tha t  the union's panel 
member and the neu tra l  chairman would be the two members to  vote fo r  
the increase. Where would they obta in the in fo rmat ion  i f  they were to 
be the ones to  j u s t i f y  the ra ise ,  as to  j u s t i f y i n g  a lower raise. 
Should the employer choose, they could c e r t a i n l y  t r a n s fe r  money from 
one pa r t  o f  the budget to  another and then c la im  not to  have the 
necessary funds. An accounting f i rm  would have to be employed should 
the burden o f  p roof  be placed on the neutra l  and union panel members.
Try ing to consider t h i s  issue and keeping past cour t  decis ions in
mind, e s p e c ia l l y  those i n v o l v i n g  any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  mandated
l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m in is t ra t i v e  funct ions of  du ly  e lec ted and appointed
members of  the governmental un i t ,  a d d i t io n a l  questions would now be
placed on the a r b i t r a t o r .  Foster be l ie ves  the f o l l o w in g  questions
would have to be ra ised by the a r b i t r a to r .
Can the community reasonably be asked or required 
to  devote more of  i t s  wealth to the p rov is ion  of 
p o l i c e  serv ices? Is the community a lready tax ing 
i t s e l f  at a l e v e l  beyond which f u r t h e r  taxes may 
be deemed excessive? Can the community reasonably 
be asked or required to  increase i t s  a l l o c a t i o n  to 
p o l i c e  se rv ices  at the expense o f  other serv ices?
Can the community reasonably be asked to reduce
the l e v e l  o f  p o l i c e  serv ices  in order to pay
higher wages? Would p ro tec t ion  in tha t  event be 
adequate? ... (Even i f  the community cannot tax 
i t s e l f  more, why can i t  not re le ga te  garbage 
c o l l e c t i o n  to p r i v a te  con trac to rs  in order to 
ra ise  p o l ic e  s a la r ie s ,  or s imply  employ fewer 
p o l i c e  o f fe rs? )  Even here, moreover, the
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t  i t s e l f  may not be an absolute  
one, as where the c i t i z e n s  are empowered to exceed 
i t  by re ferendum, (p. 125)
As noted in 1980 by Dr. l-Jeber:
C e r t a in l y  f u r t h e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  experimenta t ion o f  
t h i s  type is  warranted i f  we are to prov ide f a i r  
compensation to our p u b l i c  workers and s t i l l  avoid 
d i s ru p t i v e  s t r i k e s .  (p. 220)
The a b i l i t y - t o - p a y  question was a lso  addressed in some d e ta i l  in 
a rev iew o f  the Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n  Act by the Department o f  Labor 
and Department o f  Management and Budget (1979). While none of  the 
fa c to rs  considered by the a r b i t r a t i o n  panel are mandated to be given 
more weight, i t  is  g e n e r a l l y  thought tha t  com parab i l i ty ,  cost of 
l i v i n g  and a b i l i t y  to  pay are the three most important  fac to rs .
The repo r t  s ta tes :
The s ta tu te  does not a l lo w  the a r b i t r a t o r  to look 
at  the whole un iverse of  other employee groups and 
t h e i r  needs, c a p i ta l  expenditure needs, 
programmatic improvements and the l i k e ,  which c i t y  
o f f i c i a l s  must deal with. To do so would a l lo w  
a r b i t r a t i o n  panels to take over a l l  the 
l e g i s l a t i v e  and budgetary func t ions  of  e lec ted 
o f f i c i a l s .  (p. 48)
The re po r t  a lso  f inds  f a u l t  w i th  the lack of a t te n t io n  to
p o l i t i c a l  cons idera t ions in the a b i l i t y  to  pay arguments. Commission
member Ellman sta ted:
The p a r t ie s  th a t  have been nego t ia t ing  p o l i t i c a l l y  
over  a period, we assume, want an a r b i t r a t o r  in 
the f i n a l  ana lys is  to make a p o l i t i c a l  dec is ion 
and get them both o f f  the hook, i f  possib le.
(p. 48)
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Because of  p o l i t i c a l  cons idera t ions,  the se t t lem ent  could not be 
v o l u n t a r i l y  negotia ted, but a r b i t r a t i o n  awards get both pa r t ies  " o f f  
the hook" w i th  t h e i r  respect ive  cons t i tuenc ies .
The re po r t  f u r t h e r  coinc ides w i th  Weber's essay in s ta t in g :
U nw i l l ingness  to pay should not be confused with 
i n a b i l i t y  to  pay. The s ta tu te  does not requ ire  
the panel to  consider unw i l l ingne ss  to pay because 
o ther programmatic areas and budgets might then 
need to be revised. Value judgments about the 
d e s i ra b le  l e v e l s  o f  other p u b l ic  serv ices  are not 
required to be made by the a r b i t r a t o r .  The 
a r b i t r a t o r  is  o n ly  s t a t u t o r i l y  prescr ibed to 
determine the issue before him. I f  management 
does not argue an absolute i n a b i l i t y  to  pay and 
does not present evidence to support tha t  claim, 
then the a r b i t r a t o r  must assume an a b i l i t y  to  pay.
In fa c t ,  as Dr, Rehmus has said, the argument of  
abso lu te  i n a b i l i t y  to pay is  r a r e l y  made by 
management, (pp. 51-52)
The review found th a t  the a r b i t r a t o r s  did in f a c t  consider the 
governmental u n i t ' s  a b i l i t y  to pay and found no cause to provide 
a d d i t io n a l  weight to  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p rov is ion .  I t  a lso  found tha t  
the burden o f  proof in regards to the a b i l i t y  to pay belonged on the 
governmental u n i t  because the knowledge is  not r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b le  to 
the union.
Sections Ig and 1h should prov ide fo r  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  
con troversy  in re q u i r in g  the Michigan Employment Rela t ions Commission 
to  both rev iew the award fo r  compliance wi th  the law, as w e l l  as 
p u b l is h in g  the award so i t  is  g e n e ra l l y  a v a i l a b l e  to the pub l ic .  Both 
sides, as w e l l  as the p u b l ic ,  are e n t i t l e d  to know th a t  the laws are 
being p ro p e r ly  administered as w e l l  as seeing how the laws worked and 
were appl ied in s p e c i f i c  cases.
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Sections 2a and 2b re qu i r in g  minimum standards as w e l l  as 
t r a in in g  requirements should g r e a t l y  improve the process fo r  a l l  
concerned. An extremely competent a r b i t r a t o r  w i l l  not on ly  provide 
improved and more j u s t i f i a b l e  awards, but w i l l  a lso  be able to do so 
in a much sho r te r  t ime frame.
A l lo w in g  f o r  e i t h e r  side to re je c t  an e n t i re  l i s t  of proposed 
ne u t ra ls  should a lso  create no undue hardships on the pa r t ic ipa n ts .  
However, i f  one side were to  re je c t  the f i r s t  l i s t ,  then c e r t a i n l y  the 
o ther  side should be ab le  to  r e je c t  the second l i s t .  Some type of 
l i m i t  would have to be placed on the number o f  re je c t io n s  each side 
could employ. More s p e c i f i c  b iograph ica l  sketches on the a r b i t r a to r s  
should a lso  propose no s p e c i f i c  problems as long as both sides are 
provided w i th  id e n t i c a l  m a te r ia l .
Sections 2f, 2h and 2i are o f  s im i l a r  nature and address a rea l ,  
ra th e r  than perceived problem in the compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  process. 
The s ta ted p u b l i c  p o l i c y  placed a high le v e l  of importance on not on ly  
r e s o lv in g  disputes, but in doing so "exped i t io us ly " .  Most awards take 
up to a f u l l  year and some longer than a year. A l l  groups invo lve d  
would l i k e  to  see the t ime from the beginning o f  the hearings to the 
t ime o f  the award shortened. This however should not be done at the 
expense o f  a l lo w in g  every  conceivab le  chance fo r  a negot iated 
se t t lement to  occur.
The proposals o f  the Michigan Munic ipal League are obv ious ly  
t i l t e d  towards management's perspect ive  o f  the issues. Perhaps a more 
midd le o f  the road approach regarding Pub l ic  Act 312 was issued on
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May 21, 1979 by the Department of  Labor and Department o f  Management 
and Budget. The review was conducted in response to Governor 
M i l l i k e n ' s  1979 State o f  the State Address which d i rec ted  the two 
departments to tho rough ly  rev iew Michigan's employment re la t io n s  
s ta tu tes  and then recommend proposed rev is ions .
The review in v o lv e d  almost 80 pages of  observations and 
recommendations, some of  which were l a t e r  adopted in the form of  
amendments to  the Act. I t  a lso  provided a short  summary of the 
r e l a t i v e l y  new law.
E a r ly  in the review, i t  was sta ted th a t  in order f o r  the review
to be attempted, the premise th a t  was i n i t i a l l y  made by the
l e g i s l a t u r e  th a t  a s t r i k e  i n v o lv i n g  p u b l ic  sa fe ty  personnel such as 
p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel is  always more c o s t l y  to  soc ie ty  when 
compared to  the costs o f  an a r b i t r a te d  set t lement  must be accepted 
(p. i v ) .  Whi le t h i s  p o l i c y  judgment could be questioned, and w i l l  be
at a l a t e r  po in t ,  i t  is  the foundat ion of the review.
L e g is la t i v e  Recommendations
The f i r s t  po in t  the review considered was a l lo w in g  the Michigan 
Employment Re la t ions  Commission to remand any dispute  back to 
mediat ion and c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining as many times as they chose to do 
so. The r a t i o n a le  in v o lv e d  here was th is  amendment would n u l l i f y  any 
" c h i l l i n g "  or  "n a rc o t ic "  e f fe c ts  which have been p re v io u s ly  discussed 
(p. i v ) .  This po in t  has yet  to be adopted.
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The second major po in t  of the review in v o lv e d  a v a r ie t y  of  po in ts  
in r e la t i o n  to mainta in ing a complete t r a n s c r i p t  and w r i t te n  award fo r  
each a r b i t r a t i o n  proceeding. The State would assume the costs and 
p ub l ish  the a r b i t r a t i o n  awards on a regu la r  basis. I t  was f e l t  t h i s  
would a s s is t  in achieving more equ i tab le  awards, as w e l l  as ach iev ing 
a l e v e l  o f  peer review. These p rov is ions  have on ly  been p a r t i a l l y  
implemented (pp. v - v i ) .
A f i n a l  major l e g i s l a t i v e  recommendation p a r a l l e l s  the 
recommendation of the Michigan Munic ipal League p re v io u s ly  discussed. 
The review a lso  f e l t  there was a need fo r  at le a s t  a pre-hearing 
conference to determine ce r ta in  issues and t r y  to  re so lve  as many 
issues as possib le before convening the hearings (p. v i i ) .
A dm in is t ra t ive  Recommendations
As e a r l y  as the re lease of t h i s  report,  minimum requirements fo r  
a r b i t r a t o r s  were seen as necessary, which was seen as a way of 
increasing the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of competent a r b i t r a to r s  (p. v i i ) .  This 
same po in t  is  s t i l l  being made by the Michigan Municipal League.
The review is  supported by the League again in t r y in g  to 
fo rm u la te  ru le s  which w i l l  lead to more expedit ious award decis ions. 
Both f in d  no f a u l t  w ith the pa r t ies  or the a r b i t r a to r ,  but ra ther  j u s t  
the system i t s e l f .  Per iodic  repor t ing  is  seen as a poss ib le  s o lu t io n
to  t h i s  dilemma (p. v i i i ) .
There was a lso a discussion of ra is in g  the a r b i t r a t o r ' s  fees to 
de te r  the pa r t ies  from proceeding to a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  was found
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The second major po in t  of the review in v o lv e d  a v a r ie t y  o f  po in ts  
in r e l a t i o n  to  mainta in ing a complete t r a n s c r i p t  and w r i t t e n  award f o r  
each a r b i t r a t i o n  proceeding. The State would assume the costs and 
pu b l ish  the a r b i t r a t i o n  awards on a regu la r  basis. I t  was f e l t  t h i s  
would a s s is t  in ach iev ing more equ i tab le  awards, as w e l l  as ach iev ing 
a l e v e l  o f  peer review. These p rov is ions  have o n ly  been p a r t i a l l y  
implemented (pp. v - v i ) .
A f i n a l  major l e g i s l a t i v e  recommendation p a r a l l e l s  the 
recommendation of the Michigan Municipal  League p re v io u s ly  discussed. 
The rev iew a lso  f e l t  there was a need fo r  at le a s t  a pre-hear ing 
conference to determine ce r ta in  issues and t r y  to  re so lve  as many 
issues as poss ib le before convening the hearings (p. v i i ) .
A dm in is t ra t iv e  Recommendations
As e a r l y  as the re lease of t h i s  repor t ,  minimum requirements f o r  
a r b i t r a t o r s  were seen as necessary, which was seen as a way of  
increas ing the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  competent a r b i t r a t o r s  (p. v i i ) ,  This 
same po in t  is  s t i l l  being made by the Michigan Municipal League.
The review is  supported by the League again in t r y in g  to 
fo rm u la te  ru le s  which w i l l  lead to more expedi t ious award decis ions. 
Both f in d  no f a u l t  w i th  the pa r t ies  or the a r b i t r a t o r ,  but ra ther  j u s t  
the system i t s e l f .  Per iod ic  repor t ing  is  seen as a poss ib le  s o lu t io n
to t h i s  dilemma (p. v i i i ) .
There was a lso a discuss ion of  ra is in g  the a r b i t r a t o r ' s  fees to 
de te r  the pa r t ie s  from proceeding to a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  was found
47
however th a t  the p a r t ie s  r a r e l y  used cost as a major cons idera t ion  in 
dec id ing whether or not to  go to a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  is  be l ieved  tha t  by 
ra is in g  the costs, f i n a n c i a l l y  depr ived communities and small  unions 
would be unable to  use compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  because o f  an i n a b i l i t y  
to  pay.
The rev iew a lso  discussed l i m i t i n g  the number o f  issues placed 
before an a r b i t r a t o r .  I t  was found however th a t  in con trac ts  being 
negot ia ted f o r  the f i r s t  time, th is  wou1d be im p rac t ica l .  No 
consensus cou ld be reached on how many issues should in f a c t  be 
allowed (p. 20).
Tota l package l a s t  o f f e r  was a lso re jec ted fo r  a v a r ie t y  of  
reasons. Supported by some because i t  would l i m i t  the number o f  
issues taken to a r b i t r a t i o n ,  the premise was unanimously re jected.
The panel found tha t  the party  who be l ieved  they were the most 
reasonable on the major issues would " s l i p "  severa l  other issues in to  
t h e i r  proposal tha t  they would have no hope of  winning through 
nego t ia t ion  or a r b i t r a t i o n .  A rb i t r a to r s  in Wisconsin c r i t i c i z e  the 
whole package approach because i t  in e f f e c t  causes them to choose 
between two unreasonable o f fe rs  (p. 41).
In conclusion, the review of  the act found no evidence th a t  
c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining was adverse ly  a f fec ted by the mere presence of 
Pub l ic  Act 312, A f te r  looking at numerous cases and examples, i t  was 
found tha t  la rge c i t i e s  and m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  have specia l labor  problems 
which in and of themselves of ten lead to the use of  compulsory
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a r b i t r a t i o n .  These o f ten i n v o lv e  issues of " a b i l i t y "  or " w i l l i n g "  to  
pay issues.
The rev iew a lso  found th a t  l a s t  best o f f e r  by issue re su l ted  in 
f a r  more v o lu n ta r y  se t t lements  than to t a l  package of convent ional  
a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  a lso  found no evidence of "exce ss ive ly  high" 
a r b i t r a t i o n  awards because v o l u n t a r i l y  negotiated set t lements  are 
usu a l ly  given greater  weight by a r b i t r a to r s  in forming t h e i r  awards.
CHAPTER V
MAJOR ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC ACT 312
The prev ious discussions have g e n e ra l l y  d e a l t  w i th  changing or 
emphasizing s p e c i f i c  points  o f  the e x is t in g  lav;. The manner in which 
P ub l ic  Act 312 is  administered in Michigan is  o n ly  one of  many ways 
th a t  labo r  d isputes are d e a l t  wi th  in p o l ic e  and f i r e  serv ices  in both 
the United States and Canada.
Pre-1969 Model
An a l t e r n a t i v e  to Pub l ic  Act 312 supported by some p u b l ic  
ad m in is t ra to rs  and p o l i t i c a l  s c ie n t i s t s  i n v o lv e s  the t o t a l  repeal o f  
P ub l ic  Act 312, a l lo w in g  "essen t ia l  se rv ice "  p u b l ic  employees to be 
t rea ted  the same as other p u b l ic  employees such as school teachers. 
S t r ikes  would continue to be outlawed and there wou1d be no binding 
impasse re so lu t io n  method.
This is  not as an unreasonable proposal as i t  might f i r s t  appear. 
I t  is important  to remember tha t  more than 95% o f  a 1 1 labor  d isputes 
in the area of  "essen t ia l  serv ices"  were s e t t le d  w i thou t  the use of 
s t r i k e s  or compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings. This was one of  the 
main arguments against Pub l ic  Act 312 during i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  hearings 
p r i o r  to  1969.
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A l l  o ther  p u b l i c  employees are required to conf ine t h e i r  impasse 
r e s o lu t i o n  remedies to  nonbinding a l t e r n a t i v e s  such as mediat ion and 
fa c t f i n d in g .  While mediat ion has always been used in labor  d isputes 
i n v o l v i n g  p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel, f a c t f i n d in g  appears to  have been 
ignored as a poss ib le  a l t e rn a t i v e .
Wo s tud ies were found tha t  proposed the idea o f  e l im in a t in g  the 
mediator from the process o f  ass is t in g  the opposing p a r t ie s  to  reach 
agreement. A mediator has of ten proved to be instrumenta l  in 
improving communication between the two pa r t ies  and moving con t rac t  
ne go t ia t ions  somewhere o f f  dead-center.
Referendum Model
In order to take the pressure o f f  themselves to  negot ia te  a 
con trac t ,  some m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  have in s t i t u t e d  referendum procedures to 
s e t t l e  con t rac t  disputes. J.L. Matthews and J.B. Helburn (1930) 
conducted a study on using a vote of the people as an a l t e r n a t i v e  to 
c o l l e c t i v e  bargain ing and/or a r b i t r a t i o n .
Using the State o f  Texas f o r  an example, research found th a t  the 
idea of a l lo w in g  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining issues to be s e t t le d  by a vote 
o f  the people has been in use since 1947. L e g is la t io n  passed in 1973 
provided fo r  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining by p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel on ly  
a f t e r  a vote of the loca l  e lec to ra te .  This is  yet  to  become w ide ly  
used as o n ly  e igh t  c i t i e s  have adopted the premise of c o l l e c t i v e  
bargai ni ng.
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Matthews and Helburn found in te re s t in g  re s u l t s  in the use of the 
referendum procedure. Employee groups p re v a i le d  in almost 75% of  the 
e le c t io n s  concerning l e v e l s  o f  pay and hours of  work. The on ly  area 
where the employees l o s t  an issue more than 50% o f  the t ime was in the 
area o f  wage p a r i t y  between po l ice  and f i r e  personnel (see Table 3).
TABLE 3 




Hours 2 1 66.7
C i v i l  Service 10 3 76.9
F i re  and Pol ice Pay Rai se 14 5 73.7
F i re  Pay Raise 4 1 80.0
Pay P a r i t y 10 13 43.4
Matthews and Helburn, 1980, p. 99
Employees in sm a l le r  and/or less a f f l u e n t  m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  a lso  
seemed to fa re  as w e l l ,  or be t te r  than t h e i r  counterparts  in la rg e r  
and more a f f l u e n t  areas. Results ranged from 83% passage ra te  in 
c i t i e s  below 25,000 in popu la t ion  to 57% in c i t i e s  w i th  a popu la t ion  
over 250,000 (Table 4). C i t ie s  wi th  per cap i ta  income of  less than 
$2,000 approved 85% of a l l  e lec t ions  fo r  pay ra ises w h i le  c i t i e s  w i th
52
per cap i ta  income o f  $3,000 or more approved almost 54% o f  a l l  
e le c t io n s  (Table 5).
TABLE 4
Referenda Results by C i ty  Size
C i ty  Size Passed Defeated
Percent
Passed
Under 25,000 5 6 83.3
25,000-99,000 21 30 70.0
100,000-249,999 5 8 62.5
250,000+ 4 7 57.1
Matthews and Helburn, 1980, pp. 99-101
TABLE 5 
Referenda Results by Per Capita Income
Per Capita Income Passed Defeated
Percent
Passed
-2,000 6 1 85.7
2,000-2,999 22 31 71.0
3,000+ 7 13 53.8
Matthews and Helburn, 1980, pp. 99-101
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Matthews and Helburn a lso  po in t  out tha t  the use o f  the
referendum has almost become nonexistent.  They s ta te  th a t :
In a l l  o f  the nonbargaining s i tu a t io n s ,  the th re a t  
or actual use of the referendum remains one means 
by which f i r e f i g h t e r s  and p o l ic e  might attempt to  
gain improvements in pay and working cond i t ions .
(p. 103)
The most recent example of the referendum c i ted  was in August,
1978. P r io r  to  the e le c t io n ,  there had been widespread loca l
p u b l i c i t y  about the c i t y ' s  a b i l i t y  to h i re  and re ta in  the desired
number of p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  due to a low pay scale. A record tu rnou t  of
almost h a l f  the reg is te red  voters  approved a 48% pay ra ise  by more
than a two-to-one margin (p. 103).
Matthews and Helburn conclude t h e i r  study by s ta t in g :
. . . I t  is  poss ib le  tha t  c i t y  governing bodies have 
g e n e ra l l y  provided acceptable pay and working 
cond i t ions  ra the r  than take the chance of 
provoking referenda e i t h e r  on these aspects of 
employment or on c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining r ig h ts .
(p. 103)
In l i g h t  of  these f ind ings ,  referendum, in some form may prov ide a 
s o lu t i o n  to  some of  the c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining d i f f i c u l t i e s  found in 
the pub l ic  secto r .
Legal S t r i k e  Model
The Michigan Municipal  League, along wi th  some p u b l ic  
ad m in is t ra to rs  have argued tha t  p o l ice  and f i r e  personnel should be 
a l lowed to s t r i k e  when they fee l  negot ia t ions  have become meaningless. 
Some ad m in is t ra to rs  have argued tha t  they end up w i th  more help in
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these areas than they o r i g i n a l l y  had by invok ing mutual aid pacts wi th  
surrounding communities, as w e l l  as county and s ta te  se rv ice  
organi za t ions .
The rev iew in 1979 of  the Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n  Act by the 
Department of  Labor and Department o f  Management and Budget attempted 
to deal w i th  t h i s  issue by proposing a l im i te d  r i g h t  to  s t r i k e ,  
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  and the p u b l ic  i n te re s t  by using p o l i t i c a l  
pressure in l i e u  o f  economic pressures found in the p r iv a te  secto r.
In the proposal , s t r i k e s  are declared legal  f o r  a l l  p o l ic e  and 
f i r e  personnel p rov id ing  the f o l l o w in g  cond i t ions are fo l lowed.  The 
Court o f  Appeals could issue a back to work order a f t e r  a f in d in g  th a t  
the p u b l i c  hea l th  and sa fe ty  were being subjected to  i r re p a ra b le  harm. 
With the g rant ing  of  an in ju n c t ion ,  the a r b i t r a t i o n  process would then 
be invoked au tom a t ica l ly  (p. x) .
This proposal appears to be a workable model, but in a l l  
l i k e l i h o o d ,  would s imply postpone a r b i t r a t i o n  hearings a few extra  
days. I t  would be almost a given tha t  a s t r i k e  of  any length by 
p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel would subject the c i t i z e n r y  to  i r r e p a r a b le  
harm. The r i g h t  to s t r i k e ,  g iven these condi t ions,  would not on ly  be 
very re s t r i c te d ,  but q u ic k ly  and e a s i l y  e l im inated .
What may be an a l t e r n a t i v e  to both the review's option as w e l l  as 
Canada's option is  found in Minnesota and Wisconsin. In these states, 
the a r b i t r a t i o n  process is  the same in general as i t  is  in Michigan. 
However, should the m u n ic ip a l i t y  r e je c t  the award of  the a r b i t r a t o r ,  
po l ice  and f i r e  personnel can then l e g a l l y  s t r i k e .
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This a l lo w s  f o r  two th ings  to occur. I n i t i a l l y ,  m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  
have the op t ion  of  r e je c t in g  an award they fee l  may be excessive.
They are under no lega l  o b l ig a t io n  to accept the award fo r  whatever 
the reasons. A s t r i k e  by p o l ic e  and/or f i r e  personnel subsequent to  
the r e je c t io n  would a lso  appear to put p ub l ic  sentiment on the side of  
the worker and in tu rn  put p o l i t i c a l  pressure on the o f f i c i a l ( s )  who 
re jec ted  the a r b i t r a te d  terms.
While some form of s t r i k i n g  or w i thho ld ing  of  serv ices is  l e g a l l y  
pe rm iss ib le  in at le a s t  a h a l f  dozen d i f f e r e n t  geographic areas, the 
l i t e r a t u r e  a lso  suggests tha t  there is l i t t l e  support among members of  
the general p u b l ic  to  a l lo w  s t r i k e s  or work slowdowns by any p u b l ic  
employee, e sp e c ia l l y  po l ice  and f i r e  personnel.
This is  an option tha t  could be employed should the l e g i s l a t u r e  
choose to  vote against the wishes of  a large percentage of  t h e i r  
consti tuency. They would c e r t a in l y  be supported by the Michigan 
Munic ipal  League and some pu b l ic  admin is t ra tors.  Opposit ion would 
c e r t a i n l y  a r ise  in other groups such as po l ic e  and f i r e  unions and 
a r b i t r a t o r s ,  mediators and fa c t f in d e rs  profess ional  assoc ia t ions.
F a c t f ind ing  Model
Jack S te iber and Benjamin W. Wolkinson (1977) examined 
Michigan's experience wi th  fa c t f in d in g  and found tha t ,  outs ide of the 
educat ional  f i e l d ,  f a c t f in d in g  has been almost nonexistent.
Fac t f ind ing  can be use fu l ,  in some instances, in b r ing ing  pressures to 
bear on the pa r t ies  to accept the fa c t f in d e r ' s  conclusions. This of
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course is  not always the case as p o l i t i c a l  pressures requ ire  both an 
informed and p o l i t i c a l l y  ac t ive  pub l ic ,  which is  r a re l y  the case.
W i l l i a m  R. Word (1974) found tha t  the two opposing pa r t ies  often 
used the f a c t f i n d e r ' s  repor t  as a po in t  at which to begin bargaining. 
Word a lso  concluded tha t  fa c t f in d e rs  must be given a g reater  degree o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  than they are p resen t ly  granted in terms o f  mediating a 
labor  d ispute .
In l i g h t  o f  these conclus ions,  the f a i l u r e  to use fa c t f in d e rs  
outs ide  of the educat ional f i e l d  may be a mistake, e s p e c ia l l y  i f  they 
are g iven the f l e x i b i l i t y  to  mediate as w e l l .  Fac t f ind ing ,  w h i le  not 
o f f e r in g  a sense of f i n a l i t y ,  could p lay  an important r o le  in b r ing ing  
about a negotia ted se t t lement instead of  an awarded sett lement.
The r o le  of  the f a c t f i n d e r  could be made a much more important  
one i f  t h e i r  f ind ings  on each of  the issues were a l lowed to be chosen 
by the a r b i t r a t o r  as the actual  award. This would of  course
necess i ta te  a change in the a r b i t r a t i o n  procedures p rese n t ly  used so
the a r b i t r a t o r  would have three o f fe rs  to choose. There does e x is t  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of the a r b i t r a t o r  j u s t  using the fa c t f i n d e r ' s  repor t  
as his dec is ion and ending up wi th  a process o f  binding fac tb ind in g .
This may indeed be the s i tu a t io n ,  but the a r b i t r a t o r  would be 
under no o b l i g a t i o n  to adopt the fa c t f in d e r ' s  pos i t ion .  There a lso  
e x is ts  the p o s s i b i l i t y  tha t  the two sides may adopt the fa c t f i n d e r ' s  
re p o r t  as the se t t lement  and simply avoid f u r t h e r  negot ia t ions  or
a r b i t r a t i o n .  I f  not adopted in i t s  e n t i re ty ,  the f a c t f i n d e r ' s  repo r t
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could be used to reduce the number of  issues u l t i m a t e l y  a rb i t ra te d  by 
f in d in g  a middle ground in some areas.
Daniel G. Ga l lagher  and M.D. Chaubey (1982) studied the issue o f  
t r i - o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  as i t  is  p ract iced in Iowa. Fac t f ind ing  is  
mandated as an in termediary step between mediation and f i n a l  o f f e r  
a r b i t r a t i o n .  The f a c t f i n d e r  proposes a f i n a l  o f f e r  which he be l ie ve s  
to be reasonable and f a i r .  The a r b i t r a t o r  is  then f ree  to choose 
e i t h e r  the union's proposal, management's proposal or the f a c t f i n d e r ' s  
p ro p o s a l  (pp. 129-130).
Ga l laghe r  and Chaubey a r r iv e d  at two basic conclusions in t h e i r
research. I n i t i a l l y ,  they found th a t  pa r t ies  proceeding to t r i - o f f e r
a r b i t r a t i o n  from fa c t f i n d in g  made on ly  l im i te d  changes i f  any at a l l ,  
in t h e i r  i n i t i a l  pos i t ions .  They suggest, in a c r i t i c a l  manner, th a t  
the p a r t ie s  had l i t t l e  to  lose by mainta in ing a constant pos i t ion .
The p a r t i c ip a n ts  f e l t  the a r b i t r a t o r  would, at worst case, award the 
f a c t f i n d e r ' s  opinion, and by standing f i rm , they had at le a s t  a chance 
o f  a "p e r fe c t "  so lu t ion  to the issue (pp. 145-146).
Secondly, a r b i t r a to r s  are l i k e l y  to a f f i r m  the s o lu t io n s  proposed
by the f a c t f i n d e r ,  hence fa c t f i n d in g  could be turned in to  de fac to  
convent iona l  a r b i t r a t i o n .  The actual a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings would 
then be conducted in a type o f  "appeal process." Each side would then 
be placed in a po s i t ion  of t r y in g  to convince the a r b i t r a t o r  tha t  
t h e i r  p o s i t io n  alone is the cor rec t  pos i t ion  (pp. 145-147),
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MED-ARB Model
The concept o f  i n te g ra t in g  mediation and a r b i t r a t i o n ,  often 
re fe r re d  to as MED-ARB, has received a great deal o f  a t te n t io n  in both 
the l i t e r a t u r e  and studies. The concept is a r e l a t i v e l y  simple one in 
th a t  the same person is  both a mediator and an a r b i t r a t o r  in the case, 
should the case requ i re  a r b i t r a t i o n .  Most m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  appear to  
p lace  the emphasis on mediat ion ra ther  than a r b i t r a t i o n .  This shows 
the preference fo r  negotia ted set t lements  over a r b i t ra te d  and awarded 
set t lements .
I t  has been hypothesized th a t  the n eu t ra ls  would be in a much 
s tronger  p o s i t io n  to  mediate i f  they a lso  had the f i n a l  a u th o r i t y  o f  
a r b i t r a t i o n  behind them at the same time. As Charles M. Rehmus (1982) 
noted:
Even casual r e f l e c t i o n  demonstrates tha t  any med- 
arb process u s u a l l y  gets s e t t le d  short o f  
a r b i t r a t i o n .  The pa r t ies  are almost forced to go 
along wi th  t h e i r  mediator's suggestions, f o r  
f a i l u r e  w i l l  o r d i n a r i l y  r e s u l t  in an eventual 
order to do so. More important as a va lue in such 
a process is  tha t  the pa r t ies  often p a r t i c ip a te  in 
the outcome, cha l leng ing  the a r b i t r a t o r  to  j u s t i f y  
and exp la in  sett lements  suggested or compromises 
proposed. (p. 6)
While a number of s ta tes use MED-ARB in some form, the s ta tes o f  
New Jersey and Wisconsin appear to use i t  in i t s  most idea l  forms.
They a lso  have the unenviable task o f  t r y in g  to locate competent 
i n d i v i d u a l s  to serve in these important pos i t ions .  Harold Newman, 
Chairman of  the New York State Publ ic  Employment Re la t ions Board, 
s ta ted in 1982:
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I am not masochist enough to seek a r o le  as a 
m e d ia to r -a rb i t r a to r .  The med-arb i te r  must have a 
kind o f  s i x th  sense about how fa r  to  go in 
mediat ion before pu t t ing  on the a r b i t e r ' s  cap.
The process is  a m in e f ie ld .  (p. 7)
Jerome H. Ross (1982) concurred w i th  Newman when he made the
fo l lo w in g  observations of the r i s k s  involved in the process.
Although mediators and a r b i t r a to r s  are both in the 
business of re s o lv in g  disputes, some successful 
a r b i t r a t o r s  do not possess the s k i l l s ,  a b i l i t i e s  
and c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  to e f f e c t i v e l y  func t ion  as 
mediators, and the converse is  t rue  f o r  mediators. 
Med-arb i te rs  must be able to gain the t r u s t  and 
respect of the p a r t ie s  in a negot ia t ing  s e t t in g ,  
e s p e c ia l l y  where t h e i r  presence has been mandated 
by an outs ide a d m in is t ra t i v e  agency. This 
requ ires  an understanding o f  con trac t  
negot ia t ions ,  a sense of t im ing, and the a b i l i t y  
to  induce the pa r t ies  to  change t h e i r  pos i t ions  
through reasoning and persuasion. In add i t ion ,  
where mediation techniques prove unsuccessful,  the 
med-arb i te r  may be required to  make face - to - face ,  
on- the-spot  decis ions a f t e r  p rov id ing  the p a r t ie s  
w i th  an oppor tun i ty  to  f u l l y  present t h e i r  
arguments. Mediators and a rb i t r a to r s ,  by v i r t u e  
o f  a need to maintain t h e i r  n e u t r a l i t y  and 
a c c e p ta b i l i t y ,  are w e l l  aware o f  the r is ks  
a t tendant to  func t ion ing  in the emotion-1aden 
atmosphere of  con trac t  negot ia t ions.  Because o f  
the high v i s i b i l i t y  of con trac t  negot ia t ions ,  
n e u t ra ls  must consider the p o te n t ia l  e f f e c ts  of 
t h e i r  invo lvement in a med-arb proceeding on t h e i r  
continued a c c e p ta b i l i t y  to the labor  and 
management communities. (Newman. 1982, p. 7)
James L. Stern (1984) notes tha t  MED-ARB is  not w i thou t  i t s  own 
shortcomings. The p r i n c i p l e  d i f f i c u l t y  appears to be wi th  the 
p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  the mediator. I t  was found in Wisconsin tha t  the 
mediat ion success ra te  ranged from 42% to 100% in a s ix  person sample
(p. 45). Stern noted th a t :
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The p a r t ie s  u s u a l l y  know which mediator-  
a r b i t r a t o r s  press them hard in mediat ion and which 
do not. Therefore, in p ick ing t h e i r  mediator-  
a r b i t r a t o r s ,  those who do not want to  be mediated 
s e le c t  m e d ia to r -a rb i t ra to r s  who are not known to  
mediate a c t i v e l y ,  and v ice  versa. This aspect of  
the s e le c t io n  process probably con t r ibu tes  more to  
the exp lana t ion  o f  the wide v a r ia t i o n  in the 
mediat ion success ra te  o f  m e d ia to r -a rb i t ra to rs  
than the r e l a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t y  of the cases they 
encountered. (p. 45)
A number o f  s i tu a t io n s  can ar ise  in MED-ARB which could lead to  
d i f f i c u l t  mediat ion or an a rb i t ra te d  award. I f  one side is  extremely 
con f iden t  o f  winning the issue or is  defending a basic ph i lo sop h ica l  
po in t ,  se t t lem en t  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  at best. L i t t l e  room fo r  
f l e x i b i l i t y  and emotional negot ia tors  also complicate negot ia t ions  
(pp. 44-45).
But MED-ARB can be successful i f  the fo l l o w in g  ideas are adhered 
to  in a cons is ten t  manner. Making counte ro f fe rs  a r u le  is  a good 
s t a r t  to  keeping negot ia t ions  moving. Making each side support i t s  
p o s i t io n  and using t i  me as an a l l y  can a lso  lead to  a med i a ted 
se t t lement.  The main tenet  to be adhered to at a l l  costs is  to not 
g ive  up because the f i r s t  impression is tha t  t h i s  d ispute j u s t  can't  
be s e t t le d  (p. 45).
New Jersey Model
On January 1, 1978 New Jersey jo ined the growing number of  s ta tes 
th a t  provided some form of  in te re s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  to i t s  p u b l ic  
employees. The s ta tu te ,  known as Chapter 85, a l low s  fo r  s ix  
acceptable procedures such as (1) convent ional  a r b i t r a t i o n .  (2) f i n a l
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o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  as a package, (3) f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  on an 
issue by issue basis, (4) f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  on a package basis 
w i th  the recommendations of  the f a c t f i n d e r  as a t h i r d  choice,
(5) f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  on an issue-by- issue basis w i th  the 
recommendations o f  the f a c t f i n d e r  as a t h i r d  choice on each issue, and
(6) f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  on a package basis fo r  economic issues and 
on an issue by issue basis f o r  noneconomic issues (Tener, 1982, p. 9).
I t  is  a lso  emphasized th a t  other procedures are acceptable i f  
m u tu a l l y  agreed to by both sides, Should no agreements e x i s t  as to  
form, economic items are decided on a f i n a l  o f f e r  package basis, w h i le  
noneconomic items are s e t t le d  on an issue by issue basis (Tener,
1982, p. 9).
According to Table 5, the number of p e t i t i o n s  f i l e d  to invoke
in t e r e s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  was r e l a t i v e l y  constant in the f i r s t  fou r  years
o f  the lav/. The actual  number of a r b i t r a to r s  assigned a lso  remained
the same. The number o f  awards however has been reduced d r a m a t i c a l l y
from 103 to  65. As Tener notes:
...these f ig u re s  do cast doubt upon the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  the na rco t ic  e f f e c t  or the 
c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t  in New Jersey with  i t s  form o f  
f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n .  (p. 12)
Tener's impression a f t e r  reviewing the a r b i t r a t i o n  awards is  th a t  
three s ta tu to r y  c r i t e r i a  are the most important fac to rs  in a r r i v i n g  at 
dec is ions:  "Comparabi l i ty , changes in the cost o f  l i v i n g ,  and a b i l i t y
to pay, w i th  com parab i l i t y  serv ing as the benchmark or cen t ra l  fa c to r "
(p.  12) .
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TABLE 6
U t i l i z a t i o n  of  I n te re s t  A r b i t r a t i o n  in Mew Jersey
FY Peti t i  ons Arbi t r a to r s Awards
Year Fi led Assigned Issued
1978 210 181 103
1979 225 182 76
1980 224 173 66
1981 219 173 65
(Tener, 1982, p. 11)
Tener concludes his a r t i c l e  in a very suppor t ive  manner o f  New 
Jersey 's  i n te re s t  a r b i t r a t i o n  law.
I t  appears as though the system has worked w e l l  in 
New Jersey. There have been very few work 
stoppages since the law's e f f e c t i v e  date. Wage 
set t lements  do not seem excessive in r e la t i o n  to  
increases in the cost  of l i v i n g ,  There has been 
no great clamor to repeal the law, although 
employers sometimes p u b l i c l y  oppose i t  and unions 
sometimes express a p u b l ic  preference fo r  
convent ional a r b i t r a t i o n ,  The number of  awards 
has decreased over the f i r s t  four  years, 
in d ic a t in g  th a t  the pa r t ies  not on ly  are not 
becoming dependent upon awards in order to achieve 
contrac ts  but tha t ,  w i th in  the framework o f  the 
law and i t s  encouragement of v o lu n ta ry  
sett lements , the pa r t ie s  are in c re a s in g ly  
successful in working th ings out in a m u tu a l ly  
acceptable fashion. The f i n a l  o f f e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  
advocates and th e o re t ic ia ns  would be s a t i s f i e d .
(p. 12)
The process is ob v ious ly  not pe r fec t ,  but there are undoubtedly few 
laws or procedures which w i l l  s a t i s f y  everyone. Rigid f i n a l  o f f e r
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ru le s  discourage a r b i t r a t i o n  because of  the high costs, but a lso  
a l lows f o r  some i n ju s t i c e s  to creep in to  the f i n a l  con trac t .
Rehmus (1982) a lso  espoused the v i r tu e s  of  mediated set t lements
by adopt ing "open and f l e x i b l e  a r b i t r a t i o n  proceedings th a t  encourage
changes in o f f e r "  (p. 6). Certa in values can be e leva ted  above others
depending on the va lues of  the p u b l ic  and the p a r t ie s  invo lved .
Rehmus concludes:
My own preference is  fo r  quasi-mediated 
se t t lements ,  but I concede tha t  other p a r t ie s  have 
l e g i t im a te  preferences and goals d i f f e r e n t  than 
mine. Persona l ly ,  I cannot fo rge t  th a t  as a 
nation we are committed to the utmost in 
vo lun ta r ism  in labor re la t io n s .  We assert  tha t  
v o lu n ta ry  agreements between labor and management 
are p re fe rab le  to any kind o f  imposed set t lement.
I f  tha t  is  the case, I p re fe r  to re ta in  as much 
vo lun ta r ism  as poss ib le, even w i th in  the process 
of  binding in te re s t  a r b i t r a t i o n .  (1982, p. 6)
The p r i n c i p l e  may be known as MED-AR3, but the emphasis c l e a r l y  is  on
the mediat ion aspect with the a r b i t r a t i o n  aspect used on ly  as a l a s t
re s o r t .
This desc r ip t ion  of s ix  poss ib le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to the present 
model employed in Michigan is not intended to cover every poss ib le  
opt ion which is  a v a i la b le .  I t  is  however a short  composition o f  some 
of  the more workable options which have enjoyed vary ing degrees of  
success in o ther states. Once the values o f  the p u b l ic ,  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  
and p a r t i c ip a n ts  are known, the l e g i s l a t i o n  could then be amended to 
r e f l e c t  these b e l ie fs .  I t  can a lso  be concluded th a t  any one of the 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  or combinations chosen w i l l  have both opponents and 
proponents depending on how they view the process as a f f e c t in g  them.
CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING PUSLIC ACT 312
As the var ious  po s i t ions  o f  proponents and opponents o f  Pub l ic  
Act 312 have been examined to t h i s  po in t  in the thes is ,  charges and 
countercharges have abounded. Supporters of  the Act po in t  to  almost 
nonex is ten t  work in te r ru p t io n s  as w e l l  as the perception tha t  
a r b i t r a t o r s  s p l i t  the award so th a t  each side "wins" and " lo s e s . "
Opponents o f  the Act have taken the opposite po in t  o f  view by 
s ta t in g  tha t  p o l i c e  and f i r e  personnel and t h e i r  unions have l i t e r a l l y  
he ld m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  and taxpayers hostage in obta in ing  exo rb i ta n t  pay 
increases. They have asserted tha t  the unions have taken t h i s  
barga in ing approach because they have nothing to lose by doing so.
With these opposing claims so w e l l  def ined, the question remains, 
has the law a l lowed fo r  ce r ta in  municipal employee unions to enter 
i n to  c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining negot ia t ions  wi th  an u n fa i r  advantage over 
the c i t y  admin is t ra tors?
Some l im i te d  studies have been done on the top ic  of  how 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  may have af fec ted wage increases. Most have 
chosen to pursue the issues o f  negotiated versus a r b i t ra te d  
se t t lements  wi th  l i t t l e  t ime a c t u a l l y  spent on actual  wage increases.
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Some o ther  s tud ies  which have been done are in my opin ion f lawed in 
many respects and need f u r t h e r  in v e s t ig a t io n .
In ca r ry ing  out t h i s  ana lys is ,  the re le v a n t  studies wi th  which I 
am in agreement w i l l  be presented f i r s t  to f a c i l i t a t e  discussion. Few 
persons would disagree tha t  the Michigan Municipal League has 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  opposed c e r ta in  p rov is ions  of  Pub l ic  Act 312 and has 
c o n s i s te n t l y  c a l l e d  f o r  amendments to the Act. The fa c t  which is  
i n t e re s t in g  to note is  tha t  the League's study in 1980 found th a t  the 
a r b i t r a t o r  d id  in f a c t  of ten d iv id e  up the award by g iv in g  the union 
most of  the wage increases they requested but denying them other 
economic requests.
Consider the fa c t  tha t  the unions received 57% of  t h e i r  requested 
wage increases w h i le  los ing  more than 50% of t h e i r  o ther  economic
requests. Dr. Ernst Benjamin states the number of  union requested
increases granted to  be c lose r  to 60%, but q u a l i f i e s  even t h i s  by 
s t a t i  ng:
I t  is  cor rect ,  though of doubt fu l  s ign i f ica nce ,  to 
s ta te  tha t  f i r s t  year sa la ry  increases are higher 
than the mean statewide sa lary  increase
but
contracts  tend to  be f r o n t - 1oaded: tha t  is  to
prov ide greater  increase to base in the f i r s t  
year. I f  we assume an average con trac t  length o f
two years, awards of 10% in the f i r s t  year and 4%
plus cost of l i v i n g  in the second year would y i e ld  
a f i r s t  year average of 10%, but an annual average 
of 7% and thus rough ly  conform to the actual  
s i tu a t io n .  (p. 26)
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But even in g i v in g  the p o l ic e  and f i r e  unions on ly  s l i g h t l y  more
than h a l f  the cases, Benjamin f u r t h e r  puts t h i s  in to  perspect ive  by
cone 1uding th a t
in two o f  the f i n a l  three cases where panel sa la ry  
increases re su l ted  in sa la r ie s  above the s ta te  
mean, the panel awarded 14 of  15 and 15 of  18, 
o ther  economic awards to management. In the four 
h ighest awards..., the s a la r ie s  a l l  remained 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  below the s ta te  mean even a f t e r  the 
increase. (p. 28)
In ana lyz ing these two cons is tent  studies, i t  would ha rd ly  appear 
th a t  a " s p l i t  the d i f fe ren ce "  approach has ever been used by the 
a r b i t r a t o r s .  I t  would appear tha t  the p o l ic e  and f i r e  unions have 
rece ived on ly  s l i g h t l y  more than h a l f  o f  the wage requests presented 
to  the neutra l  and when rece iv ing  them, have tended to g ive  up a l l  
o ther  economic requests to a t ta in  new wages described as 
" s i g n i f i c a n t l y  below the s ta te  mean even a f t e r  the increase" (p. 28). 
Rather than being accused of  "c lean ing up", the co r rec t  assumption 
should be " t r y in g  to catch up," and not being real successful at doing 
so.
I t  is  imperat ive to  consider a l l  these fac ts  in doing any wage 
increase study. These dramatic pay ra ises of 15%—20% do not seem so 
dramatic when the personnel were making on ly  50% of the s ta te  average 
in the f i r s t  place, So in order to win wage increases 60% of the 
time, over 80% of other economic demands are dismissed.
P r o f e s s o r  Ben jamin  c o n t i n u e d  on i n  h i s  s t u d y  by s t a t i n g  t h a t  he 
had found  no e v i d e n c e  o f  any b ia s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  a r b i t r a t o r  i n
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choosing the union's po s i t io n  over tha t  of the m u n ic ip a l i t y  (p. 15).
Benjamin s ta tes  in support o f  t h i s  conclusion,
i f  a r b i t r a t i o n  awards were in f a c t  g e n e ra l l y  pro­
union, we would expect an increasing number of  
union lo c a ls  to  i n s i s t  on a r b i t r a t i o n  and t h i s  has 
not occurred. (p. 7)
S pe c i f ic  s tud ies on on ly  wage increases have been very l im i te d  in 
scope. One study however was done in 1984 by Douglas Alexander which 
did deal s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i th  these wage issues. The r e s u l t s  of his 
research are indeed accurate as fa r  as they are taken, but very 
s p e c i f i c  d e f ic ie n c ie s  e x is t  in the data from which the conclus ions 
were drawn.
The data used were taken from on ly  e leven c i t i e s  wi th  a 
popu la t ion  o f  25,000-50,000 in lower Michigan outs ide o f  the 
M e t rop o l i tan  D e t ro i t  area. By excluding the remainder o f  the s ta te  as 
w e l l  as m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  of  g reater  and lesser size, the data would not 
necessa r i ly  be a t rue  representa t ion of the e n t i re  statewide p ic tu re .
This l im i te d  data on Michigan pu b l ic  employees was then compared 
aga inst  data taken from Indiana and I l l i n o i s .  The problem here arose 
because Alexander noted the data from Indiana and I l l i n o i s  was not 
d is t in g u is h a b le  by any degree of metropo l i tan  in f luence ,  so he chose 
to exclude a l l  c i t i e s  which happen to f a l l  in a SM5A. This would 
the re fo re  not be a t rue  representa t ion of the real  data in e i t h e r  of 
the comparison sta tes.
Even though admitt ing the l im i t a t i o n s  of  the data used, he s t i l l  
concludes tha t  the a r b i t r a t i o n  process is  to  some degree respons ib le
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f o r  the wage d i s p a r i t y  between policemen and f iremen in Michigan when 
compared to those in o ther states. I t  is  a lso  pointed out how the 
p o l i c e  and f i r e  unions have a lso  done much b e t te r  than t h e i r  f e l l o w  
munic ipal employees in regards to  pay increases.
Alexander does note c o r r e c t l y  tha t  wages in Michigan, when 
compared to the na t iona l  average, are c e r t a i n l y  towards the top of  the 
scale . He a lso  notes tha t  p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel are paid 
cons ide rab ly  more in Michigan than in I l l i n o i s  and Indiana but t h i s  is  
v a l i d  o n ly  to a point.
I would propose the f o l l o w in g  questions be posed and answered 
before any conclusions are drawn. What have been the wage increases 
in Michigan of  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  in r e la t i o n  to the Consumer Pr ice 
Index? The perception of the p o l ic e  o f f i c e r  has a lso  changed in the 
past two decades to one o f  a profess ional  occupation in many instances 
re q u i r in g  advanced education. How do t h e i r  wages compare to those of 
an average school teacher's wage scales in Michigan? Both are in the 
p u b l i c  sector and by law cannot w i thho ld  serv ices. Teacher s t r i k e s  
however have become an i n e v i t a b le  occurrence in dozens o f  loca t ions
each y e a r  however.
Perhaps an even more i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  w o u ld  be t o  examine how 
wages o f  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  w o u ld  compare t o  t h o s e  i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
i n d u s t r y  i n  M ic h ig a n .  S t a t e  t o  s t a t e  co m p a r ison s  a re  f i n e  as f a r  as 
t h e y  a re  taken .  M i c h ig a n  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  how eve r  l i v e ,  work ,  and make 
t h e i r  pu rcha se s  i n  M i c h ig a n  and s h o u ld  be c o m p a ra b le  o n l y  t o  t h e i r  
n e i g h b o r s ,  and f e l l o w  c i t i z e n s .
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To conduct t h i s  examination, the data from a v a r ie t y  of sources 
has been compiled and presented in Table 7. In the f i r s t  column is  
the re sp ec t ive  year o f  the in fo rmat ion  studied fo l lo w e d  by the 
Consumer Pr ice Index, the average p o l ic e  wage, and the average 
manufacturing sa la ry .  The year 1967 is  convenient to  use because o f  
Consumer Pr ice Index records as w e l l  as i t  being two years p r io r  to  
P u b l ic  Act 312 coming in to  existence.
The average p o l i c e  sa la ry  is  an actual  average p o l ic e  wage from 
the State o f  Michigan. For each of the years invo lve d ,  a l l  o f  the 
p o l i c e  s a la r ie s  were a r r iv e d  at in the fo l l o w in g  manner. On any 
department w i th  a s a la ry  range, the midpoint was f i r s t  derived. A l l  
o f  these midpoints of  the s a la ry  ranges were then added together and 
t h i s  sum was d iv ided  by the t o t a l  number of  departments. A l l  
departments from a l l  regions across the s ta te  were considered in the 
ana lys is .  This should lend i t s e l f  to an accurate average fo r  
comparison purposes. Larger departments are given no add i t io n a l  
weight in t h i s  study fo r  any of  the years involved.
The ta b le  w i l l  a lso  show the percentage increase f o r  any given 
t ime period as w e l l  as the to t a l  percentage increase in r e la t i o n  to 
the base year o f  1967. This should prove usefu l in determining any 
d r a s t i c  changes in one p a r t i c u l a r  group during a p a r t i c u l a r  t ime
per i od.
The data show not on ly  the average y e a r ly  s a la r ie s  in each of the 















Po l ice  and Manufacturing Average Salar ies
Consumer Average Average
Price Pol ice 1967 Manufacturing 1967
Index_______ Salary_____ Pol 1 ars_________ Sal ary Pol 1 ars
100.0 6,311 -  6,311 7, 581 -  7,581
116.3 9,857 -  8,475 3,747 -  7,521
133.1 11,046 -  8,299 11,889 8,932
170.5 15,301 -  8,974 15,130 -  8,874
217.4 16,105 -  7.408 18.699 -  8,601
289.1 19,284 -  6,670 23,365 -  8,082
298.1 20,146 -  6,758 25.689 -  8,618
311.1 21,078 -  6,775 27,361 -  8,795
322.2 21,122 -  6,556 28,329 -  8,792
328.4 23,412 -  7,129 28,321 -  8,624
340.4 25,798 -  7,579 28,416 8,348
Michiqan S ta t i s t i c a l  A b s t ra c t . Wayne State U n ive rs i ty .  
Annual ed i t ions ,  1967-1987.
Salar ies ,  Wages and Fringe Benef i ts  in Michiqan 
M u n ic ip a l i t i e s  Over 4,000 Popu la t ion . Michigan Municipal 
League. Annual ed i t ions ,  1967-1987.
Michiqan Labor Market Review. Michigan Employment Secur i ty  
Commission, Volumes XLII and XL111.
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subsequent years a f t e r  1967, in terms o f  1967 d o l l a r s .  This w i l l  
r e f l e c t  any increase in purchasing power from the wage increases.
Concerning the p o l i c e  s a la r ie s ,  Tables 7 and 3 show an increase 
in excess o f  $2,100 was noted in 1970, s h o r t l y  a f t e r  the 
implementation o f  P ub l ic  Act 312. This increase is  f a r  too great to  
e i t h e r  ignore or a t t r i b u t e  to l i t t l e  e lse  but the new law. The amount 
a lso  dropped to  $6,670 in 1982 to y i e l d  on ly  an approximate $350 
increase in purchasing power. By 1987, the real  purchasing power had 
y ie ld e d  an increase of $1,268 which appears to be a much more average 
increase. Manufactur ing wages real  increase amounted to o n ly  $767 f o r  
the same twenty year period.
Comparisons are a lso made using the same average p o l ic e  s a la r ie s  
aga inst  those of  the average classroom teacher s a la r ie s  f o r  the same 
years. Although not as dramatic, a large increase was a lso  noted in 
the f i r s t  period from 1967 to 1970. A f te r  1976, the average p o l ic e  
s a la ry  began to show an o v e r a l l  de c l ine  through 1985, u n t i l  i t  began 
to  r i s e  again in 1986 and 1987.
In con t ras t  to  t h i s  up and down a c t i v i t y  in the p o l ic e  wages, the 
average wage o f  teachers in real purchasing power a lso  peaked in 1973 
but never f e l l  below a real  increase of $656. Through the course of 
twenty years, the real  purchasing power of teachers rose $1,405. This 
is  approximately 12% higher than the increase f o r  po l ice  o f f i c e r s .
There  a re  two i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s  t o  remember i n  t h e s e  com p ar isons .  
I n i t i a l l y ,  t h e s e  wage in c r e a s e s  came i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  c o l l e c t i v e  














Pol ice  and Teacher Average Salar ies
Consumer Average Average
Price Pol ice 1967 Teacher 1967
Index Salary Do l la rs_________ Salary_______ Pol 1 ars
100.0 6,311 -  6,311 8,238 -  8.238
116.3 9.857 -  8,475 11.034 -  9.488
133.1 11,046 -  8,299 12,852 -  9,656
170.5 15,301 -  8.974 15,426 -  9,048
217.4 16.105 -  7,408 19,663 -  9,045
289.1 19.284 -  6,670 25,712 -  8,894
298.1 20,146 -  6,758 27,104 -  9,092
311.1 21,078 -  6.775 28,440 -  9,142
322.2 21,122 -  6.556 30,067 -  9,332
328.4 23,412 -  7.129 31,412 9, 565
340.4 25,793 -  7.579 32,826 9,643
Michigan S ta t i  s t i c a l Abstrac t . Wayne State U n ive rs i ty .
Annual e d i t io n s ,  1967-1937.
Sa la r ies ,  Wages and Fringe Benef i ts  in Michigan 
M u n ic ip a l i t i e s  Over 4,000 Popu la t ion . Michigan Municipal 
League. Annual ed i t io ns .  1967-1987.
Michigan Education Associat ion (MEA).
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th a t  wages increased a f t e r  enactment o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  a l lo w in g  
c o l l e c t i v e  barga in ing in the p r iv a te  sector as w e l l .
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  p u b l i c  secto r wages were on the average lower than 
wages in the p r i v a t e  sector. This a l lowed fo r  g reater  increases as 
p u b l i c  sec to r  employees attempted to catch up in terms of  o v e r a l l  
compensation. Some have argued tha t  p u b l i c  sector wages could have 
been ra ised higher because they were a r t i f i c i a l l y  low in the f i r s t  
pi ace.
The l a t e  60's were a lso  a t ime o f  change in a v a r ie t y  of other 
ways. Because of  the many instances o f  c i v i l  unrest in t h i s  t ime 
period,  demands f o r  change in both the s t ru c tu re  and personnel o f  
p o l i c e  departments were required. The general consensus was tha t  the 
o v e r a l l  c a l i b e r  o f  the p o l ic e  o f f i c e r  had to be improved so the 
o f f i c e r  would be more responsive to the needs of  the community. In 
order to accomplish t h i s  goal,  a number o f  p ro jec ts  were undertaken.
The federa l  government played an extremely important r o le  by 
a l l o c a t i n g  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  fo r  equipment, as w e l l  as t r a in in g  and 
r e t r a in in g  of  present and fu tu re  p o l ic e  o f f i c e rs .  In order to a t t r a c t  
candidates w i th  higher q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  s a la r ie s  a lso  had to be raised. 
This was the on ly  way to a t t r a c t  q u a l i t y  candidates and re ta in  q u a l i t y  
personnel .
P o l ice  departments were a lso  faced with having a much 1arger 
percentage of  t h e i r  workforces comprised of  these higher q u a l i t y  
personnel working f u l l  t ime instead of part time. This change a lso 
required an increase in s a la r ie s  as p o l ic e  o f f i c e r s  now had to make a
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l i v i n g  from t h e i r  p o l i c e  wages, not j u s t  some extra  money from a par t  
t ime job.
With a combination o f  la rge  amounts o f  federa l  funds, more 
educat ional  p re re q u is i te s  f o r  employment as w e l l  as becoming a f u l l  
t ime profess ion,  wages would have c e r t a i n l y  improved with or w i thou t  
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n .  The exact degree is  o f  course an unknown 
quanti  ty .
A f t e r  examining the i n i t i a l  ra tes o f  pay and then comparing the 
ra tes o f  increase to  those of  the Consumer Price Index, average 
manufactur ing wage, and the average teacher's wage, the average p o l ic e  
o f f i c e r ' s  wage has increased approximately 20% over i t s  ra te  in 1967. 
Teacher's and manufacturing wages have r isen 17% and 10% r e s p e c t i v e l y  
in 1967 d o l l a r s .  A l l  three groups have managed to stay ahead of  
i n f l a t i o n  however, the average p o l ic e  wages are s t i l l  lower than both 
manufacturing and teaching average wages by $769 and $2,064 
respect i  ve ly.
This evidence c l e a r l y  shows tha t  the p o l ic e  o f f i c e r s  in Michigan 
have, on the average, received percentage wage increases s l i g h t l y  
h igher than those in teaching and manufacturing during the l i f e  of 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n .  This would not ind ica te  p o l ic e  o f f i c e r s  
g e t t in g  r i c h  at the expense of municipal budgets. Rather, when taken 
in t h e i r  e n t i r e t y ,  they have merely attempted to keep pace wi th  two 
o ther  segments of the working popula t ion in r e la t i o n  to purchasing
power.
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When these fa c ts  are taken in to  account, along w i th  previous 
fa c ts  th a t  p o l i c e  unions have l o s t  a large percentage of  other 
economic issues when they did win wage increases, the s i t u a t io n  would 
appear to be less favo ra b le  to  p o l ic e  wages again.
In t r y i n g  to maintain a degree of fa i rness  concerning these wage 
issues, c e r ta in  issues must be raised. I t  is  g e n e r a l l y  known tha t  
teachers have ten to tw e lve  steps of wage increases based on both 
experience and a d d i t io n a l  education. I t  is  a lso  t rue  th a t  the number 
o f  new teachers h ired during ce r ta in  periods were l im i te d  w h i le  the 
wages of  e x is t in g  teachers would continue to  increase due to 
a d d i t io n a l  experience and education. This is  t rue  f o r  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  
as w e l l ,  but to  a much lesser extent.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
Since the mid-1960's, i t  has t r u l y  been the era o f  the p u b l ic  
employee. Jobs in the p u b l i c  sector have continued to grow at an 
unprecedented ra te  as the general economy has turned to one of  se rv ice  
as opposed to  a g r i c u l t u r e  and manufacturing. Pub l ic  employee unions 
across the country now represent la rge numbers o f  members in var ious 
work groups, e s p e c ia l l y  po l ice  and f i r e  personnel.
One o f  the biggest problems in p u b l ic  sector labor  r e la t i o n s  is  
the complete lack of  u n i fo rm i ty  because o f  the absence of  a federa l  
labor  law. The oppor tun i ty  ex is ts  f o r  there to be 50 d i f f e r e n t  laws, 
de a l ing  wi th  p u b l ic  sector employees, and no two need be a l i k e .  Most 
s ta tes  have outlawed s t r i k e s  in most instances, but s t i l l  s u f f e r  from 
unexpected work stoppages in various employee groups.
Michigan's experiences with these p u b l ic  employee groups have 
been an in te re s t in g  phenomenon. While a l l  p u b l ic  employees are 
forb idden to s t r i k e ,  on ly  "essen t ia l  serv ices"  personnel are g iv in g  a 
binding f i n a l  d ispute re s o lu t io n  process which is compulsory 
a r b i t r a t i o n .  I t  has a lso been observed tha t  almost w i thou t  exception, 
the law has f u l f i l l e d  i t s  purpose, tha t  of avo id ing p o l ic e  and f i r e  
personnel s t r i k e s .
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But the e n t i r e  issue of  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  has had both i t s  
proponents and opponents since the debate on the l e g i s l a t i o n  began 
over twenty years ago. C r i t i c s  have opposed the law as a v i o l a t i o n  o f  
the s ta te 's  c o n s t i t u t i o n  on a v a r ie t y  of f ro n ts  such as home r u le  and 
sovere ignty .  Others have claimed the law's very ex istence makes real 
c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining impossib le because the pa r t ies  can s imply l e t  
the a r b i t r a t o r  decide and a l l o w  them to save face in f r o n t  of t h e i r  
re spec t ive  groups. S t i l l  others have claimed tha t  the process i t s e l f  
i s  add ic t ing  in and of  i t s e l f .
The two la rg e s t  c r i t i c i s m s  in v o lv e  the costs o f  the process 
i t s e l f .  C r i t i c s  c la im  tha t  unions have nothing to lose by going to 
a r b i t r a t i o n  and tha t  m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  have c o n t i n u a l l y  been forced to 
pay e x o rb i ta n t  awards to p o l ic e  and f i r e  personnel at the expense o f  
loca l  budgetary considerat ions.
The o n ly  problem with  a l l  of these c r i t i c i s m s  is  tha t  t h e i r  
importance is d r a m a t ic a l l y  oversta ted or s imply  not supported by the 
evidence, Merely making a statement or hypothesis does not make i t  
t rue  and i f  i t  is  true, make i t  a c o n t r o l l i n g  fa c to r  in the outcome o f  
any p a r t i c u la r  process.
The m a jo r i t y  of persons s t ro ng ly  b e l ie v e  tha t  s t r i k e s  by p o l ic e  
and f i r e  personnel should not be al lowed under any circumstances. For 
t h i s  reason. I b e l ie v e  the le g is la t u r e  was co r rec t  in not a l low in g  
s t r i k e s  by these personnel. That is  the wish o f  the people.
Problems begin to a r ise  when a process to work out the i n e v i t a b le  
labo r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  is  discussed. There has to be a process in p lace
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f o r  these essen t ia l  employees" to  get a f a i r  hearing on t h e i r  wage 
and working cond i t ion  requests i f  they cannot come to an agreement 
w i th  t h e i r  employer. Our e n t i r e  system is supposed to be based on a 
premise o f  everyone having a f a i r  hearing of t h e i r  gr ievance or 
d i f f i c u  y and re ce iv ing  a f a i r  and im pa r t ia l  dec is ion by a neutra l  
pa r ty  a f t e r  hearing the evidence. Too much is  at stake fo r  these 
persons to  fee l  they were not even given a f a i r  hearing.
But t h i s  is  f a r  from the end of  the controversy.  Numerous 
s tud ies  have found th a t  the c h i l l i n g  e f f e c t  and na rco t ic  e f f e c t  have 
been both shor t  l i v e d  and g r e a t l y  overexaggerated. This is not to say
th a t  they have never, or do not, ex is t .  The fa c t  remains th a t  there
is  an average of  on ly  30 a r b i t r a te d  awards each year w h i le  the
remainder are s e t t le d  somewhere before tha t  f i n a l  po int.
The asser t ion  tha t  the union r isks  nothing because they have 
nothing to lose is  a lso  not true. With a rb i t ra te d  awards tak ing w e l l  
in excess o f  a year to f i n a l i z e ,  there may be an in c e n t iv e  fo r  the 
m u n ic ip a l i t y  to  s t a l l  so they can avoid paying higher wages e a r l i e r  
and save the in te re s t  on the wages. While most awards have invo lve d  
r e t r o a c t i v e  pay, they do not inc lude any l o s t  i n te r e s t  or the loss of  
re c e iv in g  the money at a l a t e r  date when i t s  va lue is  less due to 
i n f l a t i o n .
I t  has o f ten  been stated tha t  the higher the costs or poss ib le  
r i s k ,  then the less the process would be used. The d i f f i c u l t  pa r t  is  
to  determine who should bear what r is ks  or costs. At t h i s  time, the 
union alone loses on the wa i t ing  period p r io r  to rece iv ing  the award,
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A s o lu t i o n  here might be to make the award not on ly  r e t r o a c t i v e ,  but 
a lso  inc lud e  i n te r e s t  i f  the a r b i t r a t o r  were to  f in d  f o r  the union. I 
s e r io u s ly  doubt i f  the m u n ic ip a l i t i e s  would l i k e  to share in t h i s  
cost.
The most important cur ren t  issue facing the l e g i s l a t u r e  is  
whether to change the weight given to the section concerning the 
a b i l i t y  to  pay and who w i l l  have the burden of  proof concerning t h i s  
question. Most research has shown th a t  the weighting should not be 
changed or th a t  the union should bear the burden of proof th a t  the 
m u n ic ip a l i t y  could pay the award.
P u b l ic  sa fe ty  personnel have a lso been accused of  g e t t in g  r i c h  at 
the expense o f  c r i t i c a l l y  short municipal funds. But when compared to 
teachers and workers in manufacturing, the p u b l ic  sa fe ty  personnel 
have received ra ises almost equal in percentage over the past twenty 
years. This was done at the expense o f  other economic requests which 
they l o s t  approximate ly 80% o f  the time when they won t h e i r  wage 
i ncrease.
This does not mean th a t  there are no poss ib le  ways in which 
Pub l ic  Act 312 could be amended so tha t  i t  could be made more 
e f f i c i e n t  or less l i k e l y  to be invoked. A s e le c t  number o f  other 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  have been presented and discussed, such as l im i te d  
s t r i k e s ,  other forms of  a r b i t r a t i o n  as w e l l  as the referendum.
C le a r l y  a l l  o f  them have some points which would be des i rab le ,  but do 
any of  them guarantee a per fec t  answer to a l l  the questions?
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Everyone would agree tha t  the best long term s o lu t io n  would be a 
process th a t  never had to be invoked. But our world is  f a r  from 
p e r fe c t  and the law has been put in place because there is a need fo r  
i t .  Proposals f o r  ex tens ive  coo l ing  o f f  periods would do l i t t l e  more 
than push a r b i t r a te d  awards c lo s e r  to the two year mark and fu r th e r  
reduce morale in the meantime. 3oth sides need to assume some r i s k  i f  
t h i s  proposal is  to  work.
The i n te r e s t i n g  aspects noted were those of  the referendum where 
the people are a l lowed a d i r e c t  vote on the issue o f  pay f o r  t h e i r  
p u b l i c  servants. I t  was a lso  in te re s t in g  to note tha t  the c i t i z e n r y  
was i n c l i n e d  to g ive  1arger ra ises to the p o l ic e  and f i r e  unions than 
were t h e i r  e lec ted  representa t i  ves, so much so tha t  the p o l ic e  and 
f i r e  unions would s imply  threaten a vote and then rece ive  an agreed 
upon ra ise .
There is always room fo r  improvement in the area of  pu b l ic  law.
No one would argue the fa c t  th a t  the most idea l  s i t u a t io n  would be to 
need no law at a l l ,  or to  at le a s t  have a pe r fec t  law, Such w i l l  
never be the case. Perhaps the best th ing to do is  to avoid both the 
un ion’s suggestions and the m u n ic ip a l i t i e s '  suggestions and l i m i t  any 
changes to the law to ones which have been supported by independent 
research by d is in te re s te d  part ies .  We owe the taxpayer and p u b l ic  
sa fe ty  worker no less than a f a i r  day's pay fo r  a f a i r  day's work.
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